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From the Editor
Welcome to the Fall 1999 issue of the Journal of Transportation Management If you take 
just a few minutes of your valuable time to scan the contents, I think that you will find 
something of interest both personally and professionally. The diversity of articles and 
topics covered goes beyond what you would expect to find and is indicative of the diversity 
defining our industry. I am always indebted to the authors for their patience, quality of 
research and writing, and for thinking of the JTM as an outlet for their work. I offer my 
sincere gratitude to the members of the Editorial Review Board who contribute to the 
success of this and every issue. Remember that the reviewers are volunteers—they agree 
to give their time and expertise and ask for nothing in return. I could not do my job 
without them. Steve Rutner and Brian Gibson, my associate editors, continue to add 
quality leadership and direction to the Journal Many people contributed to the completion 
of this issue. I'm sure that you will enjoy the end result!
The lead article in this issue, by Julie Gentry, Matthew Waller, and Scott Keller, reports the 
results of a study of purchasing strategies among manufacturing firms. They identify four 
hybrid purchasing strategies that fall between the two extremes of transaction-based and 
just-in-time purchasing. The second article, by Rick Clarke, chronicles the development of 
U.S. maritime unions and, more recently, their decline in membership and influence. 
Changes in union power and influence are also discussed within the context of maritime 
policy and regulation. Drew Stapleton and Virginie Saulnier discuss the history of 
INCOTERMS in the third article. In addition to carefully contrasting the 1990 and 2000 
versions of the INCOTERMS, the article provides a clear and concise description of each of 
the 13 international commercial terms. Uma Gupta, Randy Butler, and Thomas Milner offer 
an inside look at the development of an automated gate system at Union Pacific Railroad 
in the fourth article of this issue. The case study follows the implementation of the system 
for fully automating the data collection, inspection, assessment, and reporting of damage 
claims to rail equipment. In the final article of this issue, John Kent, Stephen Parker, and 
Charles Pettijohn summarize the results of a 1999 survey of truckload shippers concerning 
the impact of Y2K on their anticipated volume of shipments and equipment needs. They 
also look at what actually occurred in the dry van, temperature controlled, and flatbed 
segments of this industry after the new year began. They provide a unique look at the 
"before and after" activity associated with the Y2K scare. There should be something for 
everyone here. I hope that you take the time to read each of the articles in this issue. I 
think you will be glad that you did.
As always, I thank John Youngbeck, CEO of the International Intermodal EXPO, and his 
board of directors for their commitment not only to the Journal of Transportation 
Management and Delta Nu Alpha International Transportation Fraternity but also to the 
future of logistics and transportation education.
Speaking of commitment and financial support, remember that we cannot survive and 
continue to publish without reader support. Please join or renew your membership in Delta 
Nu Alpha International Transportation Fraternity and subscribe to the Journal of 
Transportation Management Share this issue with a colleague and encourage him/her to 
subscribe today!
Jerry W. Wilson, Editor
Journal of Transportation Management
Georgia Southern University
Southern Center for Logistics and Intermodal Transportation 
P.O. Box 8154
Statesboro, GA 30460-8154
(912) 681-0257 (912) 871-1523 FAX
jwwilson@gsaix2.cc.gasou.edu
Stephen M. Rutner, Associate Editor 
(912) 681-0588 
srutner@gsaix2.cc.gasou.edu
Brian J. Gibson, Associate Editor 
(334) 844-2460
bgibson@cob-l.business.auburn.edu 
And visit our web sites:
Delta Nu Alpha Transportation Fraternity: www.wmgt.org/deltanualpha 
Georgia Southern University Logistics: www2.gasou.edu/coba/centers/lit
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JTM is to serve as a channel for the 
dissemination of information relevant to the 
management of transportation and logistics 
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EXPLORING ALTERNATIVE 
PURCHASING STRATEGIES: 
JUST-IN-TIME OR JUST ENOUGH?
Julie J. Gentry 
University of Arkansas
Matthew A. Waller 
University of Arkansas
Scott B. Keller 
Michigan State University
What are the prevalent purchasing strategies used by manufacturing firms to purchase 
components that are critical to the quality of their most important products? This research 
reports the findings from data on purchasing strategies collected from 248 companies. The 
data indicate that although firms seem to be moving away from a transaction-based 
purchasing strategy towards "partnership" relations necessary for successful just-in-time 
strategies, firms are likely to embrace one of four hybrid purchasing strategies that on a 
spectrum would fall somewhere between the two "pure" strategies. These identified strategies 
offer purchasing managers viable alternatives to moving directly into a just-in-time 
environment.
INTRODUCTION
Effective purchasing strategy can contribute 
significantly to the success of most modern 
organizations. Surveys of U.S. manufacturing 
firms indicate that purchased materials account 
for an average of 57 percent of the sales dollar, 
while total labor costs (wages, salaries, and 
fringe benefits) consist of only one third of the 
purchase percentage (U.S. Bureau of Census 
1989). Therefore, purchasing dollars must be 
managed strategically in order to improve the 
financial position of organizations (Reck and
Long 1988). It is also well understood that the 
overall quality and service capabilities of any 
manufacturing firm are heavily influenced by the 
performance of its suppliers. Research suggests 
that 50 percent of a company's quality non­
conformances are caused by defective purchased 
materials (Leenders and Fearon 1993). 
Recognizing the importance of the purchasing 
functions and their overall effect on a firm's 
financial and quality performance, organizations 
are expanding the role of purchasing in the 
corporate strategic planning process (Fearon 
1988).
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Several strategic decisions under the discretion of 
purchasing managers in a manufacturing 
environment have been identified in the 
literature. Each of these decisions has the 
potential to influence a firm's competitive position 
(Waller 1993). The most frequently cited of these 
decisions are (1) the number of suppliers of 
critical components to use, (2) length and type of 
contract to use with suppliers, if any, (3) 
frequency with which to share production 
scheduling or forecasting information, (4) criteria 
to be used in selecting suppliers, and (5) the 
frequency of deliveries of critical components.
These five purchasing decisions are strategic in 
the sense that they have long-term consequences, 
pertain to the mutual sharing of critical 
information, and result in the selection and 
dismissal of suppliers. Reducing the number of 
suppliers of critical components has a long-term 
consequence because it can often take months or 
even years for new suppliers to be able to produce 
highly specialized, critical components. This can 
be due to the need for specialized manufacturing 
equipment or due to the capacity constraints of 
the supplier. A long-term contract has long-term 
consequences by definition. Frequent sharing of 
demand information with a supplier may 
eventually entail investment in EDI technology. 
The criteria that are used to select suppliers will 
have consequences for as long as those suppliers 
are used. Finally, moving toward more frequent 
deliveries may involve a change in the mode of 
transportation, additional investment in 
materials handling equipment, and changes in the 
receiving and inventory procedures— collectively 
implying long-term decisions.
These five decisions are discussed in the 
literature within the context of two general 
purchasing strategies: just-in-time purchasing 
(JITP) using cooperative buyer-supplier part­
nerships, and traditional purchasing (TP) in an 
open bargaining environment (Waller 1993). 
With respect to the five strategic purchasing 
decision variables, JITP vis-a-vis TP involves: 
using fewer suppliers for a given component 
(Ansari and Modarress 1988), longer term 
contracts with suppliers (Perry 1988), frequent
sharing of production schedule information 
(Trelevan and Schweikhart 1988), using many 
criteria—not just price—for selecting suppliers 
(Ansari and Modarress 1988), and taking frequent 
deliveries of components (Perry 1988).
Crosby (1984), Russell (1985), and Stundza (1984) 
suggested that U.S. manufacturing firms wrere 
moving away from open market supplier 
transactions toward closer buyer-supplier 
relations. Spekman (1988) described these 
emerging relationships as “alliances,” Johnston 
and Lawrence (1988) as “partnerships,” while 
Heide and John (1990) contrasted them with the 
more traditional “arm's length” type of 
interaction. A strategic partnership between a 
purchasing firm and a supplier has been defined 
as “a mutual, ongoing relationship involving a 
commitment over an extended period of time, and 
a sharing of information and the risks and 
rewards of the relationship” (Ellram 1990). More 
recently, Hendrick and Ellram (1993) indicated 
that strategic supplier partnerships have become 
an enduring purchasing initiative that may be 
necessary for competitive leadership and survival 
in the future.
While the use of supplier partnerships is no doubt 
growing in popularity, there appears to be a 
consensus in the literature that supplier 
partnerships develop over time, rather than being 
constructed overnight (Ellram 1991). 
Furthermore, although several characteristics 
have been identified as common among strategic 
partnerships when viewed as a whole, there is 
also evidence that firms engage in partnership 
relations for a variety of reasons and desired 
outcomes (Hendrick and Ellram 1993). Based on 
the long-term nature of partnership development 
and the lack of a single underlying strategic 
direction common to partnership relations, it 
seems logical to assume that many organizations 
do not adhere to a single pure strategy of JITP or 
TP, but rather some type that falls in between the 
two ends of the spectrum. Therefore, a primary 
objective of this research is to assess the use of 
pure JITP and TP strategies relative to other 
hybrid types of strategies.
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BUYER-SUPPLIER PARTNERSHIPS
The purpose of this section of the paper is to 
present an overview of the buyer-supplier 
partnership concept and its relationship to JIT 
purchasing. First, various definitions of 
partnerships and recurring themes within those 
definitions are identified. The second part of this 
section provides the linkage between the buyer- 
supplier partnership concept and a JIT 
environment.
Buyer-Supplier Strategic Partnership 
Definitions
The concept of the buyer-supplier strategic 
partnership has numerous definitions and 
synonyms in the literature. Although each 
definition is unique, there are common 
"dimensions" of these relationships that can be 
identified by a careful review of the literature. 
Several recurring themes are suggested in the 
numerous definitions of buyer-supplier strategic 
partnerships, including (1) the presence of long­
term commitments; (2) information sharing and 
open communications; (3) cooperative continuous 
improvements on cost reductions and increased 
quality; and, (4) the sharing of risks and 
rewards of the relationship (Gentry 1994).
Strategic partnerships require a long-term focus 
and relations with a limited number of suppliers 
(Shapiro 1985). Ohmae (1989) also points out 
that coalitions must be long-term, strategic 
relationships which must be carefully defined, 
developed, and understood to prevent 
unreasonable expectations.
A second partnership theme identified in the 
review of the buyer-supplier literature is 
information sharing and open communications. 
More casual and open lines of communication 
between the firms allows for increased flexibility 
and adaptability (Bevan 1989). Sharing of 
information is also essential to accelerating the 
product development cycle and speeding the 
introduction of new or altered products to the 
marketplace.
A third recurring theme found in numerous 
definitions of buyer-supplier strategic 
partnerships is a cooperative and continuous 
emphasis on cost reductions and quality 
improvements. Dwyer et al. (1987) suggest that 
a buyer's anticipation of high switching costs 
increases the buyer's interest in maintaining a 
quality relationship. Both buying and selling 
firms can enjoy a reduction in administrative 
costs since purchase orders, receiving reports, 
inspection duties, payment transactions, and 
sales calls are decreased (Landeros and Monczka 
1989).
A fourth recurring theme found in the literature 
on buyer-supplier partnerships is the sharing of 
risks and rewards of the relationship. 
Companies seek to minimize their degree of 
technical or financial exposure, especially when 
entering new product markets or expanding the 
geographical coverage of an existing market 
(Williamson 1975). Technology and asset 
sharing are frequently cited as benefits in 
forming strategic partnerships (Landeros and 
Monczka 1989). Partnerships allow firms to 
share capital investment costs and the 
substantial learning costs of introducing new 
products or making technological advancements 
(Cavinato 1991). Maintaining close buyer- 
supplier relationships and sharing superior 
skills and resources increases the likelihood of 
successful product innovations (Landeros and 
Monczka 1989).
Use of Partnerships in a Just-in-Time 
Environment
The JIT concept has been adopted widely by 
purchasing management. To summarize the 
concept, its objective is to eliminate waste of all 
kinds from the delivery and production systems, 
using a method of drawing materials through the 
system on an “as needed” basis as opposed to a 
“push” system (Hall 1983). The benefits of JIT 
implementation include reduced inventory levels, 
higher product quality, increased flexibility, and 
higher productivity. To achieve the coordination 
necessary for effective JIT processes, buyer-
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supplier cooperation must replace open market 
competition. Toyota’s card control system, 
Kanban, is a prime example of this concept. In 
essence, the whole plant and suppliers act as 
progressive work centers where inventory is 
staged for production. The system relies on a set 
of cards, move and production cards, utilized to 
authorize the movement of parts between work 
centers and the production of new parts to 
replace those used. The card circulation is 
placed in motion by requiring the using work 
centers to request or retrieve needed parts from 
the supplying centers. Master Lock, a 
Milwaukee based manufacturer of padlocks, also 
utilizes the JIT concept in their pull system. 
Color-coded containers are placed in bins. Each 
color represents a lock type and each container 
holds a standard lot size of twenty units. 
Production needs are withdrawn from the 
containers and as a container drops below the lot 
size the units are combined with another 
container of identical parts and the empty is 
returned to the supplying area for 
replenishment.
Given the critical nature of suppliers in a JIT 
environment, Bagchi (1988), Bookbinder and 
Dilts (1989), and O’Neal (1987) indicate that 
buyer-supplier partnerships are necessary for 
effective operations. It has been suggested that 
JIT relationships are the most cooperative buyer- 
supplier relations, due to the level of 
interdependence and long-term orientation that 
are required. In a comparison of market and JIT 
exchange relationships, JIT relations (1) have a 
longer term orientation; (2) necessitate frequent 
communication between firms; (3) involve 
moderate to high levels of specialized 
investments; (4) require a reduction in number of 
suppliers (with sole-sourcing optimal); (5) involve 
a high level of risk; and, (6) necessitate a high 
frequency of shipments (Frazier, Spekman and 
O’Neal 1988).
The purpose of this discussion is not to advocate 
the use of JIT relations, but rather to support 
the linkage between the buyer-supplier 
partnership and JIT concepts. Although it has 
been found that a JIT environment is not
necessary for a successful buyer-supplier 
partnership (Hendrick and Ellram 1993), it can 
be posited that buyer-supplier partnerships are 
necessary for a successful JIT system.
METHODOLOGY
Literature indicates two widely accepted pure 
purchasing strategies; traditional purchasing 
and just-in-time purchasing with supplier 
partners. Among the many distinctions, 
adopting one strategy over the other has been 
shown to dictate how purchasing dollars will be 
spent and how firms strategically influence their 
long-term direction. Research by Bagchi (1988), 
Bookbinder and Dilts (1989), O’Neal (1987), and 
others indicates that organizations are moving 
away from traditional purchasing and rapidly 
adopting the "win-win" philosophy commonly 
associated with strategic partnerships. The 
following research questions were identified in 
an effort to further establish the utility and 
consequences of the various strategic purchasing 
decisions made by firms:
1. Do firms tend to use either the pure JITP 
strategy or the pure TP strategy?
2. Are other identifiable strategies being used?
3. What decisions have firms made about the 
often-cited strategic purchasing variables, 
namely, length of commitments, information 
sharing, cooperative continuous improve­
ments, and the sharing of risks and rewards?
Survey Instrument and Data Collection
To answer these questions, a mail survey was 
sent to 1,035 manufacturing firms in the 
fabricated metal products industry (SIC 34). 
While all of the firms in this study were involved 
in metal fabrication of some sort, a broad range 
of firm sizes and process technologies—ranging 
from job shops to assembly lines—were 
represented. For example, represented firms 
may include manufacturers of metal cans, 
hardware, metal forgings, cutlery, and other 
manufacturers of metal and wire products.
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Consequently, having selected only one industry 
(SIC 34), industry specific variations are 
reduced, improving the internal validity of the 
study. Since a wide variety of process 
technologies are represented, external validity is 
enhanced, improving the general applicability of 
the findings.
Questionnaires were sent only to those firms 
with 100 or more employees and a purchasing 
manager in the manufacturing plant. The 
letters were addressed to the mid-level 
purchasing managers. After the first mailing, a 
reminder letter was sent to non -respondents. 
Then a third letter with a copy of the 
questionnaire was sent to the remaining non­
respondents. After all three mailings, 248 
questionnaires were returned, resulting in a 24 
percent response rate. To rule out possible 
response bias, a difference of means test (T-test) 
between early and late respondents was 
conducted on various relevant variables and no 
significant differences were found.
JIT was not mentioned in the cover letter or 
questionnaire to help avoid biases in the answers 
to the items on the questionnaire. Neither were 
firms asked whether they use buyer-supplier 
partnerships; they were simply asked questions 
about the five strategic purchasing variables 
identified above. The respondents were asked to 
answer the questionnaires in reference to one 
critical component they purchase for a primary 
product since most firms using supplier partner­
ships only use it with components that are 
critical to quality (Freeland 1991). It was 
explained that "critical component" meant a 
component having a significant impact on the 
quality of the final product and that "primary 
product" meant one of the company's leading 
products in terms of sales revenue. Although we 
were interested in having some firms in the 
sample that use JITP, we wanted to have firms 
employing many strategies.
RESULTS
The next section deals with the results of the 
exploratory empirical investigation. This section 
is divided into five subsections, each dealing with 
a different strategic purchasing variable. These 
include (1) the number of suppliers, (2) the 
length of the contract, (3) the sharing of 
information, (4) the criteria used for supplier 
selection, and (5) the frequency of delivery. The 
data include all firms in the sample—not just 
those that might be classified as JITP.
Number of Suppliers
Advocates of JITP and supplier partnerships 
encourage firms to use fewer suppliers for 
critical components, sometimes even suggesting 
single sourcing (Deming 1982). It is easier to 
manage, for example, two suppliers than it is 
twenty; more resources can be expended per 
supplier for supplier development when fewer 
suppliers are used. Furthermore, when fewer 
suppliers are used it is easier to develop closer 
relationships with the suppliers, resulting in 
better buyer-supplier communication, enhancing 
the supplier's ability to meet the demands of the 
buyer more accurately. Also, a firm using fewer 
suppliers needs each supplier to provide a higher 
volume of production of the component that is 
being procured than would otherwise be the case. 
This facilitates the supplier's path down the 
learning curve in terms of cost and quality.
In this survey, respondents were asked how 
many suppliers they used over the past year for 
the critical component they selected for 
answering the questionnaire; Figure 1 shows 
the results. As can be seen, 58 percent used five 
or more suppliers and 19 percent used only one 
supplier. Only 4 percent used dual sourcing, an 
often-cited approach to reaping the benefits of 
JITP while reducing the possibilities of the 
negative outcomes such as disruption of supply
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(Juran and Gryna 1980). Even using a broad 
definition of JITP, which allows for the use of 
dual sourcing, only 23 percent of the firms used 
this strategy—the majority of the firms used five 
or more suppliers over the past twelve months.
Length of Contract
The requirements of a strategic partnership 
include the need to view the relationship as a 
series of exchanges without an endpoint, and the 
need to establish various mechanisms to monitor 
and execute the operations of the partnership 
(Henderson 1990). Perry (1988) found that 
companies successful with JITP used long-term 
contracts. In a recent study, Helper (1991) found 
that the average length of a contract between a 
parts supplier and an automotive manufacturer 
almost doubled between 1984 and 1989.
This research addresses two primary areas: the 
use of contracts and their duration. Figure 2 
summarizes the results. Over half of the 
respondents indicated they used contracts of less 
than one year, with only 14 percent indicating the 
use of contracts for a period beyond two years.
Sharing Information
Another characteristic of JITP and strategic 
partnerships is the sharing of production 
scheduling or forecasting information with 
supplier partners. The sharing of scheduling 
information allows the supplier to better plan 
production, allowing higher productivity and 
quality levels. If a company shared scheduling 
information on a weekly basis but it was for a 13 
week planning horizon, for example, then that 
would be counted as weekly sharing of 
production scheduling information. In a JITP 
supplier partnership environment, having fewer 
suppliers makes it easier to share information 
and have more open lines of communication. 
Intuitively, if a buyer is willing to reduce its 
supplier base, it seems likely that it would 
attempt to fully exploit the potential benefits by 
sharing scheduling and forecasting information.
As can be seen from Figure 3, almost half of the 
companies never share production scheduling or
forecasting information with their suppliers. 
Firms are not taking full advantage of a reduced 
supplier base.
Criteria for Selecting Suppliers
When utilizing a TP strategy, price is the 
predominant supplier selection criterion for 
evaluation. In this traditional open market 
bargaining environment, price-driven tactics 
such as competitive bidding, positional 
negotiations, and value analysis are used. Most 
of these tactics force suppliers to base their 
supplier selection decisions on short-term 
considerations. Often the result of this operating 
environment is, ironically, lower quality products 
and ultimately higher product costs to the buyers 
(Hahn, Kim and Kim 1986).
Typical supplier selection criteria include price, 
delivery performance, and quality considera­
tions. Since supplier partnerships are more 
strategic in nature and require a longer-term 
planning horizon, the argument has been made 
that these relationships require the 
consideration of additional factors for selecting 
suppliers (Ellram 1990). These include (but are 
not limited to) organizational issues such as 
cooperation, availability of technology and 
financial resources, and other unique factors 
that may include safety, location, and a 
supplier's existing customer base.
In this study, the respondents were given a 
sample list of criteria that might be used for 
selecting suppliers: quality, price, delivery 
performance, financial resources, cooperation, 
geography (location), and engineering capability. 
They were asked to check each one that they 
used in selecting the supplier(s) of their critical 
component. Figure 4 summarizes the findings, 
showing what percentage of firms used various 
numbers of the criteria in selecting suppliers. 
Only 4 percent of the firms used two or fewer of 
the criteria, and 21 percent used all seven 
criteria.
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Frequency of Deliveries
To realize the full benefits of JIT, a firm must 
receive frequent and reliable deliveries of high 
quality parts in small sizes and exact quantities 
(Schonberger 1982). This requires efficient, 
reliable communications and information sharing, 
which was emphasized in the earlier section 
defining the common themes of buyer-supplier 
partnerships. Similarly, another theme found in 
partnering relations is a cooperative and 
continuous emphasis on cost reductions. The
underlying goal of small, frequent deliveries is an 
overall reduction of inventory and associated costs.
In this study, firms were asked how often they 
received deliveries from suppliers of their critical 
component. Figure 5 summarizes the findings. 
Only two of the 248 companies took delivery of 
critical components on an hourly basis. However, 
74 of the 248 companies (30 percent) took 
deliveries daily, while 75 percent indicated that 
their firms took deliveries monthly or less 
frequently.
FIGURE 1
NUMBER OF SUPPLIERS OF CRITICAL COMPONENTS
FIGURE 2
LENGTH OF CONTRACT USED WITH SUPPLIER OF CRITICAL COMPONENT
Length of Contract in Years
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FIGURE 3
FREQUENCY OF SHARING PRODUCTION SCHEDULING OR FORECASTING 
INFORMATION WITH SUPPLIERS OF CRITICAL COMPONENTS
Daily
Frequency of Sharing Scheduling or 
Forecasting Information
FIGURE 4
NUMBER OF THE FOLLOWING CRITERIA USED IN 
SELECTING SUPPLIERS OF CRITICAL COMPONENT: 
QUALITY, PRICE, DELIVERY PERFORMANCE, FINANCIAL RESOURCES, 
COOPERATION, GEOGRAPHY, AND ENGINEERING CAPABILITY
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Number of Criteria Used in Selecting 
Suppliers
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FIGURE 5
FREQUENCY OF DELIVERIES OF CRITICAL COMPONENTS
Frequency of Deliveries
CONCLUSIONS AND 
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
The survey results indicate that most firms are not 
using either a pure TP or JITP strategy. Rather, 
firms appear to employ different purchasing 
strategies for different components. Based on the 
significant correlations from data shown in Table 
1, four alternative strategies seem present: the 
frequent sharing of information (X3) with long 
term contracts (X2) indicates a commitment 
strategy; selectivity in choosing suppliers (X4) with 
frequent sharing of information (X3) suggests an 
information strategy; frequent deliveries (X5) with 
selectivity in choosing suppliers (X4) implies an 
interaction strategy; and, few suppliers (XI) with 
infrequent deliveries (X5) suggests an efficiency 
strategy. Each resultant strategy has different 
managerial and strategic implications for firms 
employing them as discussed in the following 
sections.
Commitment Strategy
The commitment strategy involves firms that 
frequently share information and engage in long­
term contracts with suppliers (refer to Table 1, X3
and X2 respectively). Both elements of this 
strategy involve a commitment on the part of the 
buyer. The long-term contract reduces the buyer's 
flexibility to some extent, although this is 
dependent on the details of the specific contract. 
The buyer's demonstrated commitment can 
facilitate the development of a potentially 
successful relationship. The supplier will be more 
willing to invest in machines and labor to enhance 
its ability to meet or exceed the buyer's 
expectations.
Sharing information results in commitment in two 
ways: it develops human asset specificity and 
physical asset specificity. Human asset specificity 
arises due to "learning by doing." This occurs on 
both sides of the dyad, since good communication 
takes time to develop. Physical asset specificity can 
develop as a result of the implementation of EDI. 
Additionally, frequent sharing of information can 
be both time consuming and expensive.
Both elements of the commitment strategy— 
frequent sharing of information and long-term 
contracts—are consistent with one another in that 
they both represent a commitment on the part of 
the buyer to the supplier.
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TABLE 1
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
Fewer
Suppliers
(XI)
Length of 
Contract 
(X2)
Fewer Suppliers3 
(XI)
Length of Contract (X2) -0.03
Frequency of Sharing 
Scheduling Information (X3)
0.11 0.27*
Number of Criteria Used (X4) 0.04 0.09
Frequency of Deliveries (X5) -0.27* 0.04
Frequency of Number of Frequency of
Sharing Scheduling Criteria Deliveries
Information (X3) Used (X4) (X5)
0.16*
0.11 0.22*
* Statistically significant at p < .01.
a The number of suppliers reported was reverse coded; higher levels of XI implies fewer suppliers
Therefore, this strategy is most appropriate in 
situations where such a commitment is 
important for the successful procurement of 
the component. This would be the case, for 
example, when it is necessary for a supplier to 
buy specialized assets or develop specialized 
skills in order to manufacture the component. 
Another example would be a situation where a 
component's specifications are frequently 
changed, making close communications 
imperative. A buyer's commitment to a 
supplier can enhance a supplier's willingness 
to cooperate with such frequent changes.
Purchasing managers must assess their critical 
component manufacturing needs and the 
capabilities of suppliers with respect to 
fulfilling such requirements. Those firms 
requiring very specialized inputs that may not 
be easily reproduced, for example, must protect 
their sourcing interests by fostering long-term 
relationships with willing suppliers. Buyers 
must assure that suppliers possess the 
strategic and structural ability and willingness 
to make the modifications necessary for 
providing exact component specifications. 
Commitment strengthens as parties become 
secure in exchanges based on long-term
contracts. Trust is manifest by investment in 
the tools necessary to completely fill the 
expectations of the buyer. Procurement 
officers must see that partnering firms’ 
information systems are adequately integrated 
so as to ensure the sharing of important, 
sensitive, and timely exchanges.
Information Strategy
The information strategy is composed of two 
facets: (1) selectivity in choosing suppliers, and 
(2) frequent sharing of information (refer to 
Table 1, X4 and X3 respectively). The buyer 
may collect information about a potential 
supplier's product quality, pricing, delivery 
performance, financial stability, willingness to 
cooperate, location, and engineering capability. 
Based on that information, the buyer decides 
whether to use that supplier. After supplier 
selection, the buyer begins a regime involving 
sharing information with the supplier on a 
regular and frequent basis.
When uncertainty about suppliers' abilities to 
deliver quality products on-time pervades the 
sourcing decision, the information strategy is 
most likely to be used. If a company were
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purchasing high frequency ultrasonic 
transducers for flaw detection, then the 
information strategy would be appropriate. 
These products are not particularly complex, 
but they are typically assembled to order 
because of slightly different specifications in 
orders. The quality of these components can 
vary significantly from one company to the 
next, and due to technical reasons, firms 
require different quality standards. 
Consequently, it pays for companies to be 
highly selective in choosing suppliers of these 
components. After that, the components often 
require on-going adjustments to properly meet 
the demands of the buyer. This requires 
continual and frequent sharing of information.
Manufacturers of products highly sensitive to 
quality specifications must be particularly 
critical in supplier selection. Suppliers must 
have proven demonstration of adherence to all 
performance criteria prior to the business 
exchange. Procurement managers must 
develop acceptable criteria ratings and ensure 
that the information technology is in place to 
effectively disseminate quality specification 
updates.
Interaction Strategy
The interaction strategy entails frequent 
deliveries of the critical components and high 
selectivity in choosing suppliers, both of which 
require a great deal of interaction between the 
buyer and supplier (refer to Table 1, X5 and X4 
respectively). The strategy yields a highly 
coupled buyer-supplier dyad where the 
feedback loop is minimal and where there is an 
appropriate congruency of the buyer's needs 
and the supplier's capabilities.
Congruency between the buyer's needs and the 
supplier's capabilities is achieved by the buyer 
analyzing numerous performance measures in 
the supplier selection process. Once the 
supplier is selected, the company using this 
strategy maintains a high level of interaction 
by taking frequent deliveries of components. 
The interaction resulting from the frequent
deliveries is likely to be successful with this 
strategy since the congruency of the two 
companies is assured by the up-front 
investment of time in the detailed analysis of 
the supplier.
Procurement officers are encouraged to identify 
their strategy with respect to managing 
inventory. Firms requiring minimal inventory 
levels will look for suppliers who can 
accommodate frequent deliveries. Due to 
holding low levels of inventory, selection of 
suppliers must be critical and only those able 
to perform this level of delivery service need be 
considered.
Efficiency Strategy
The efficiency strategy contains two 
facets—use of fewer suppliers and less 
frequent deliveries (refer to Table 1, XI and X5 
respectively). The two facets together lead to 
various cost efficiencies in purchasing, 
although typically not viewed together in a 
single strategy. These two variables together 
as part of a pure JITP strategy would entail 
the use of fewer suppliers with more 
deliveries. However, there is a logical and cost 
efficient reason why companies would employ 
an efficiency strategy.
The use of fewer suppliers can reduce both 
administrative costs and component costs. 
Administrative costs can be reduced since 
there are fewer suppliers to manage and 
coordinate. Additionally, by reducing the 
number of suppliers and increasing the volume 
purchased from these suppliers, the component 
costs can be reduced by leveraging purchase 
volumes. Using fewer suppliers makes it 
easier for the buyer to take advantage of 
quantity discounts, and less frequent deliveries 
allow the buyer to gain transportation 
efficiencies, thus reducing total delivered cost 
of the components.
Consequently, manufacturers purchasing 
components with low inventory holding costs or 
those most conducive to transportation
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efficiencies are encouraged to employ efficiency 
strategies. It is also recommended for those 
organizations where the purchasing 
department procedures are complex, slow, 
unstandardized, and bureaucratic, which 
greatly increases ordering and administrative 
costs. Therefore, purchasing managers must 
identify suppliers associated with volume 
discounts and strive to achieve relationships 
with select vendors in an effort to ensure large 
volume availability and improve future per 
unit cost savings. Ideally, the efficiency 
strategy should not be used to cope with such 
an inefficient purchasing department; instead, 
the company should eventually reengineer the 
purchasing process.
In summary, the ways in which the five 
strategic purchasing decision variables are 
used are manifestations of the purchasing 
strategies themselves. These purchasing 
variables can be used in many ways but they 
are most often discussed under the rubric of 
the JITP strategy, contrasted to the TP 
strategy. However, these variables can, and 
are, used in other combinations. While there 
are many benefits associated with JITP, it does 
not make sense to purchase all components 
using that strategy. The HP Greeley Division 
uses JITP to purchase only about 1 percent of 
their parts (Ansari and Modarress 1988).
This research identified four purchasing 
strategies that do not clearly fit into any 
previous category such as TP or JITP. Firms 
are likely to implement one of these four 
strategies while moving from a traditional 
purchasing strategy into long-term strategic 
supplier partnerships and JITP.
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
More empirical research in this area is needed 
to facilitate a better understanding of these 
strategies and their effect on overall firm 
performance. Such research should focus on 
various components, using a typology of the 
components (e.g., critical versus not critical, 
cost, quality). While the firms in this study 
represented various process technologies, due 
to the scope of the sample the results may only 
be applicable to the fabricated metal products 
industry. Future research should look at how 
different categories of purchases should be 
managed and investigate cross-industry and 
industry-specific patterns of behavior among 
firms. Lastly, the effect of buyer supply chain 
positioning (channel position) should be 
assessed to reveal evidence, if any, that buyers 
with greater channel power (i.e., in the 
extreme, monopolistic) have a greater 
propensity to pursue traditional purchasing 
strategies or perhaps natural market forces 
lead firms to greater levels of cooperation.
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MARITIME UNIONS AND 
THE U.S. MERCHANT MARINE
Richard L. Clarke 
Clemson University
U.S. maritime unions have played a vital historical role in both the defense and the economic 
development of the United States. The economic and the political forces that helped shape 
and promote the growth of U.S. seafaring labor unions changed dramatically in the 1990s. 
Maritime union membership in the United States has fallen by more than 80 per cent since 
1950. Inflexible union work rules and high union wage scales have contributed to this decline. 
Recent regulatory and industry changes require a new union approach if U. S. maritime 
unions are to survive the next decade.
INTRODUCTION
In 1994, America’s two largest ocean carriers, 
Sea-Land and American President Line (APL) 
applied to the Maritime Administration 
(MARAD) for permission to change the country 
of registry of several of their largest and newest 
container ships from the United States to 
foreign, so-called flag of convenience countries. 
The CEOs of these two companies joined forces 
to argue that unless the federal government took 
immediate action to create significant new 
operating subsidies, their companies would be 
unable to continue to compete with foreign-flag 
carriers whose crew costs per month are about 
one-third that of U.S. flag carriers.
Organized maritime labor vigorously opposed the 
reflagging proposal because it would have 
eliminated several hundred union jobs. Since 
passage of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 
ship owners registering their ships in the United 
States have been required to crew their ships 
with U.S. citizens who are union members. U.S.
maritime labor is organized and controlled by 12 
major AFL-CIO chartered unions and 18 
company-sponsored unions. Over the past 60 
years, maritime unions have in large part 
controlled crew size and crew costs on vessels of 
U.S. registry. The gauntlet laid down by APL 
and Sea-Land posed a serious threat to U.S. 
maritime labor unions, whose membership has 
shrunk significantly from post-WWII levels. 
Fortunately for organized labor, the situation 
was resolved in their favor when the Clinton 
Administration persuaded Sea-Land and APL to 
maintain U.S. registry for the ships at issue by 
offering a new operating subsidy bill.
In 1996, after years of intensive lobbying by 
several different maritime interest groups, 
Congress passed the Maritime Security Act of 
1996. Under this plan, Sea-Land and APL as 
well as smaller operators of U.S.-registered deep- 
sea vessels (U.S. flagships) will receive 
significant subsidy payments for designated 
ships. In exchange, the carriers must pledge to 
provide the subsidized ships to the Department
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of Defense upon request to support emergency 
military sealift needs. The primary beneficiaries 
of this law, Sea-Land and APL, subsequently 
dropped their request to change the country of 
registry for their ships to foreign countries where 
ship operating costs are much lower (called 
reflagging or flagging out). Sea-land and APLs’ 
response to the passage of this new maritime 
subsidy program preserves what remains of the 
U.S. flag deep-sea fleet. The real underlying 
issue that motivated their request for reflagging 
was not addressed. The real issue is the 
continuing high cost of unionized U.S. maritime 
labor relative to the rest of the global shipping 
industry.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the 
impact maritime unions have had on the growth 
and development of the U.S. Merchant Marine 
through their strikes, lobbying efforts and more 
recent cooperation with carrier management. 
The development and influence of maritime 
unions is traced from the Maritime Security Act 
of 1915 to the present. The paper briefly reviews 
the history of maritime unions then examines 
the impact maritime unions have had on the 
formation of national policy regarding the U.S. 
Merchant Marine. The paper concludes by 
considering the implications of the Ocean 
Shipping Reform Act of 1998 (OSRA) and recent 
ocean carrier mergers.
HISTORY OF U.S. MARITIME UNIONS
To understand the impact that maritime unions 
have had on the U.S. flag shipping industry, it is 
necessary to understand the pervasive nature of 
U.S. maritime unions in the industry. U.S. 
maritime unions include both licensed and 
unlicensed seamen on U.S. flag oceangoing 
vessels, Great Lakes ships and inland waterway 
tugs and barges. There are two longshoremen’s 
unions, five unions for shipyard workers, twelve 
primary seagoing unions and nineteen 
independent labor unions who do business with 
individual oil companies (Heine, 1976). Over the 
years these unions became very powerful 
because they have had the legal right to
determine crew size and composition for 
different classes of ships. More importantly, 
U.S. maritime unions are empowered to assign 
only union members to crew U.S. flag vessels, 
determine what they will be paid and how long 
they may be at sea. These powers have enabled 
the unions to control the variable cost of 
oceangoing labor for U.S. flag shipping.
The Strengthening of Maritime Unions
The genesis of U.S. maritime unions can be 
traced back to the Seamen’s Act of 1915. This 
act established the legal right of maritime 
workers to form unions and create standard 
work rules for all their members. This act also 
ended imprisonment for deserting one’s ship and 
established standards for food and quarters 
aboard U.S.-flag ships. There is little doubt the 
Seamen’s Act of 1915 was vitally needed to 
protect crew members from human rights abuses 
by powerful shipping companies and 
shipmasters.
The rights of maritime workers were further 
strengthened by the Merchant Marine Act of 
1936. This law, best known for its creation of 
operating (ODS) and construction differential 
(CDS) subsidies, improved living and working 
conditions for maritime labor. It also empowered 
labor unions to select only select union members 
for crew duty. A year later in 1937, a federal 
commission completed a comprehensive review 
of the operation practices of U.S.-flag carriers 
and maritime labor union management.
This commission found several problems. The 
main problems identified by the commission 
included interunion friction, union-shipper 
conflict, crew inefficiencies and a general lack of 
discipline and order aboard ship (Quartel, 1992). 
The commission attempted to solve these 
problems through a program that included 
subsidies to improve onboard living conditions, a 
minimum wage for each rating and manning 
scales. Federal guidelines were also enacted to 
cover overtime pay, maximum time at sea and 
vacation time for union members.
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During the 1930s, maritime unions played a 
significant role in improving safety, living 
conditions, training, pay and compensation of 
labor and made the U.S. maritime industry a 
much more desirable place to work. As a result, 
there was constant supply of skilled seamen 
available to operate an increasing number of 
U.S. flag vessels and make the U.S. Merchant 
Marine a powerful force as the United States 
prepared to enter World War II. Following the 
conclusion of World War II, the U.S. Merchant 
Marine began a long and steady decline in its 
size and strength. As shown from U.S. Maritime 
Administration data in Table 1, the number of 
U.S. seamen sailing aboard U.S. deep-sea vessels 
declined more than 80 per cent from 1950 to 
1999 (Marad, 1999). This steep decline closely 
paralleled the decline in the size of the U. S. 
Deep Sea Fleet from 1100 vessels in 1950 to 283 
at the beginning of 1999.
TABLE 1
UNION WORKFORCE, 1950-1999
Jobe
Source: Maritime Administration, Office of Maritime 
Labor, Training, and Safety
This decline can be attributed to several external 
factors including (1) intense competition from 
state-owned and state subsidized foreign 
carriers, (2) lack of consistent U.S. maritime 
promotion policy, (3) growth of container
shipping and container handling technology and 
(4) large seasonal and annual swings in the 
demand for ocean transportation. These and 
other factors have led U.S shipowners to reflag 
more and more of their ships to reduce operating 
cost and be more competitive with low cost 
shipping offered by foreign lines. These factors 
have combined to put increasing pressure on the 
already strained relationship between organized 
maritime labor and U.S. carriers. The unions 
have consistently strived to raise labor rates and 
maintain crew sizes while the owners have 
continued to eliminate high-cost union jobs by 
registering more vessels in foreign countries like 
Panama, Liberia, Honduras, and more recently 
the Marshall Islands. In 1970, the Nixon 
Administration tried to resolve some of these 
nagging union-management disputes and 
revitalize the U.S maritime industry.
Cooperation for Revitalization
The serious deterioration of the United States 
Merchant Marine between 1946 and 1969 caused 
in part by union-management disputes led to the 
passage of the Merchant Marine Act of 1970. 
The goal of this act was to revitalize the U.S. 
merchant marine by promoting the construction 
and use of American flag ships.
To accomplish this goal, the Act attempted to 
control the high cost of operating U.S. flag ships. 
Sea-going wages were indexed and crew size was 
to be decided in the ship design phase rather 
than negotiated by maritime unions. The act 
envisioned 300 new U.S. flag ships would be 
built in U.S. shipyards by 1980. Unfortunately, 
only 63 new U.S. merchant cargo ships were 
built and the Act fell far short of revitalizing the 
deteriorating U.S. maritime industry (Whitehurst, 
1983).
In 1972, several maritime unions agreed to new 
rules aimed at increasing cooperation with U.S. 
ship owners. Six seagoing and shoreside unions 
agreed to rules aimed at increasing maritime 
labor stability and improving the image of the 
merchant marine. Irwin Heine (1976) lists the 
five major provisions of the agreement:
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• No strike during the period of contract 
negotiations.
• Three to five year contracts to provide 
assurance with respect to continuity of 
operations.
• Uniform contract expiration dates.
• Provision for automatic wage adjustments 
annually.
• Establishment of mechanism or procedure for 
the resolution of disputes without stoppages.
These new cooperative policies were formulated 
by maritime union leadership to foster a spirit of 
cooperation with carrier management; however, 
the critical issues of crew sizes and ocean going 
pay rates were not addressed.
MARITIME UNIONS AND 
MERCHANT MARINE POLICY
Maritime unions have been consistent in their 
position on merchant marine policy. Their main 
goal has always been to protect the American 
maritime labor from foreign competition by 
supporting policies and programs that promote 
the competitiveness of U.S. flag and U.S. 
manned vessel operations. These include 
support of the Jones Act and other policies and 
reform proposals, which would make it easier for 
U.S. operators to acquire new vessels and 
operate them under the U.S. flag.
Maritime unions tend to support policies which 
would level out the playing field of international 
shipping and reduce the need or desire for 
American vessel operators to expand their 
foreign flag operations. However, U.S. maritime 
unions have often been criticized for supporting 
protectionist trade policies. In addition, their 
lobbying efforts have raised some concern. The 
Seafarers International Union and International
Organization of Masters, Mates, and Pilots are 
represented by lobbying groups on Capital Hill- 
the Transportation Institute and the Maritime 
Institute for Research and Industry 
Development, respectively. While these 
“institutes” may appear to be research oriented 
organizations, they are primarily lobbying 
groups. The Transportation Department’s 
Maritime Administration reimburses subsidized 
ship companies for the dues, which are paid to 
these “institutes.” In essence, the lobbying 
efforts of these big groups are being supported by 
taxpayer’s money. Such reimbursement has 
been estimated at approximately $2 million per 
year (Quartel, 1992).
Lobbying Activities of Maritime Unions
Maritime unions also influence legislation by 
making PAC (Political Action Committee) 
contributions to members of Congress who have 
authority over maritime policy. In 1992, for 
example, maritime unions contributed nearly 
$500,000 to members of the Merchant Marine 
and Fisheries Committee. In the same year, the 
Seafarers International Union and the National 
Marine Engineers Beneficial Association 
contributed roughly two million dollars to 
members of Congress (Quartel, 1992). Maritime 
labor unions lobbied hard to get the Maritime 
Policy Reform Act of 1992 passed and signed into 
law.
Union leaders laid the foundation for maritime 
reform with their support of HR1126 in 1991. The 
purpose of this legislation was to require foreign 
ships to comply with the National Labor 
Relations Act and Fair Labor Standards Act. The 
unions supported this proposal because they felt 
the extension of U.S. labor laws to foreign flag 
ships operating in the U.S. would benefit their 
interests. The proposal would help by keeping 
foreign flag operators from having the competitive 
advantage, which they gained, by not having to 
adhere to minimum wage levels and working 
conditions. U.S. maritime unions lost this battle 
when the bill was defeated in Congress.
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Erosion of Maritime Unions in the Early 
1990’s
In 1994, the union representing seagoing 
engineers, the Maritime Engineers Benefit 
Association (MEBA), agreed to a new labor 
contract that reduced union compensation in 
exchange for better job security. Under these 
new contracts most MEBA members starting 
receiving reduced benefits, including lower 
overtime pay rates. In 1995, there were several 
events that weakened organized maritime labor.
During 1995 several more U.S. owned ships were 
flagged out, old U.S. flag freighters were retired 
and the movement to repeal the Jones Act gained 
wider support. The unions also had their share of 
serious internal problems. Perhaps the most 
significant was the conviction of five officers of 
District I/MEBA for conspiracy mail fraud, 
extortion, racketeering, and the theft of $6 million 
from union members (Shrock, 1995). This 
conviction gave the FBI and the Department of 
Labor the impetus to intensify investigations of 
maritime union activities and financing 
throughout the U.S.
Other maritime unions were also affected by 
internal problems and external economic 
pressures in 1995-1997. The National Maritime 
Union of America lost some of its member U.S. 
flag bulk carriers because of severe union- 
management conflicts. It is likely that union 
problems in the nineties are a result of the poor 
financial condition of many U.S. flag operators. 
As smaller U.S. flag carriers quit the shipping 
business, union membership further declined. 
Further problems arose when several union 
members under federal investigation filed charges 
against their own union president (Shrock, 1995).
The nagging problem of what to do about low cost 
foreign flag competition was not resolved during 
this period. The differential between U.S. union 
sea-going wages and those paid by competing 
foreign lines remained a major union- 
management issue as the decade came to a close.
SEAGOING WAGES
The issue of U.S. Merchant Marine seagoing 
wages versus European, Asian, and flag-of- 
convenience crews has been hotly debated for 
several years. U.S. labor leaders claim U.S. 
seamen are not paid significantly higher wages 
than foreign seamen. As evidence they cite higher 
rates per ton paid by the Defense Department 
during the Persian Gulf war to move military 
freight on foreign ships versus the same cargo on 
U.S. flag ships (Boggs, 1999).
On the other hand, U.S. ships owmers assert that 
U.S. crew costs are much higher for the same 
class and size ship. They claim U.S. crew costs 
average as much as 2.5 times more than flag-of- 
convenience crew costs making it economically 
infeasible to use U.S. registry without federal 
operating differential subsidies (Whitehurst, 
1996). Two recent pay studies offer new evidence 
to support the agreement raised by U.S. ship 
owners.
Published sources from the U.S. Maritime 
Administration and the International Transport 
Workers Federation reported comparative average 
crew costs associated with operating an 
equivalent size container ship for one month 
(Whitehurst. 1996). These costs in U.S. dollars 
are compared in Table 2.
TABLE 2
COMPARATIVE CREW COST FOR A 
CONTAINERSHIP BY REGISTRY
(U.S. $)
European Asian United States
$80,000 $95,000 $340,000
Source: Whitehurst (1996). Original source
cited in the article was the Maritime 
Administration, “Competitive Manning 
of U.S.-Flag Vessels,” Annual Report of 
the Maritime Administration, 1995.
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A recent breakdown by crew position done by 
Whitehurst also shows U.S. crew costs are 
significantly higher than European, Asian, or flag- 
of-convenience crew costs (1996) (See Table 3).
It should be noted that the International 
Transport Federation (ITF) wage scales apply to 
the highest paid 20 percent of flag-of-convenience 
vessels. Reliable data on the lowest paid foreign 
crews is unavailable, but it is widely believed that 
non-ITF crews are paid significantly less that ITF 
crews. U. S. maritime unions have dealt with the 
pay disparity by lobbying Congress to enact 
protectionist legislation that mandates the use of 
U. S. ships and U.S. seamen. The most recent 
such legislation is the Merchant Marine Act of 
1996.
IMPACT OF THE
MARITIME SECURITY ACT OF 1996
As the need to deploy a very large U.S. military 
force to the Persian Gulf started to grow in early 
1990, maritime labor found a strong ally in the 
Defense Department. When President Bush 
decided to send military forces to the Persian Gulf 
in August of 1990, the U.S. Merchant Marine was 
not capable of supplying enough ships or crewmen 
to get the job done. The administration was 
forced to request merchant shipping support from 
its NATO allies. Fortunately, several allies that
supported the policy of military intervention in 
the Persian Gulf had sufficient sealift capability 
to help and the will to do so. Foreign carriers like 
Maersk of Denmark made their ships available to 
the U.S. Defense Department. By the time the 
deployment (Operation DESERT SHIELD) was 
completed, more than 60% of the merchant sealift 
of U.S. military supplies and equipment to the 
Persian Gulf had been provided by foreign-flag 
ships (Pagonis, 1992). Operation DESERT 
SHIELD highlighted the shortage of U.S. cargo 
ships and U. S. civilian crewmen and greatly 
helped the unions put pressure on Congress to 
provide new operating subsidies to guarantee the 
future availability of U.S.-flag ships. Five years 
after Iraqi forces were removed from Kuwait, 
Congress passed the Maritime Security Act of 
1996.
Eight major unions that fought hard for this new 
subsidy bill were the International 
Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union, 
International Organization of Masters, Mates 
and Pilots, Maritime Firemen’s Union, Sailors’ 
Union, Sailors’ Union of Pacific, National Marine 
Engineers Beneficial Association, Seafarers 
International Union, and American Maritime 
Officers. Union leaders emphasized the benefits 
of this act on the U.S. economy, employment 
rate, and national defense capabilities.
TABLE 3
MONTHLY SEAGOING WAGES (U.S. $)
Position U.S. Flag European Asian ITF
Master $32,653 $9,697 $4,331 $2,884
2nd Officer 18,727 7,036 1,979 1,491
Radio Officer 15,142 5,475 2,874 1,491
1st Engineer 23,229 8,425 2,796 1,862
2nd Engineer 18,848 7,845 1,979 1,491
Chief Steward 9,053 7,619 2,118 1,491
Able Seaman 6,022 4,510 1,610 856
Source: Whitehurst (1996). Original source cited in the article was the Maritime Administration, 
“Competitive Manning of U.S.-Flag Vessels,” Annual Report of the Maritime Administration, 
1995.
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The new law answers the challenge laid down by 
Sea-land and American President Lines, at least 
for the near-term. It established the Maritime 
Security Program (MSP) with new operating 
subsidies for 47 militarily-useful U.S. flag ships 
over a 10-year period (1996-2005). The owners of 
each ship will receive approximately $2.1 million 
per ship per year. In return the owners pledge to 
maintain U.S. registry and, of course, U.S. crews 
on these designated ships. The Maritime 
Security Act of 1996 provides the ship owners 
and the labor unions with the first significant 
maritime subsidy program since the Merchant 
Marine Act of 1970. This Act is designed to 
protect U.S. merchant marine jobs, improve 
national defense sealift capability and insure a 
U.S. flag presence in international shipping 
through 2005. However, recent U.S. ocean 
shipping regulatory reform and industry 
consolidation may have already diluted the 
beneficial impact unions hoped for.
Recent Ocean Carrier Consolidation
In 1999, Denmark’s A.P. Moller, the parent 
company of Maersk, purchased the international 
division of Sea-Land Services, Inc. This recent 
takeover of the largest U.S.-flag carrier follows 
the 1997 takeover of American President Line 
(APL) by Neptune Orient Lines (NOL) of 
Singapore and the 1997 CP Ships (Canadian) 
takeover of Lykes, the third largest U.S. ocean 
carrier (Beargie, 1999). These mergers have 
placed 31 (3 Lykes ships, 9 APL ships and 19 Sea- 
Land/Maersk ships) of the 47 total MSP vessels 
under foreign control (Damas, 1999).
For the time being these 31 vessels continue to be 
manned by U.S. union seamen. When the MSP 
comes up for renewal in 2005, the issue of foreign 
ownership may force Congress to find other 
alternatives for defense sealift. While it is too 
soon to identify all the likely alternatives, it 
seems clear the protection of U. S. seafaring jobs 
provided by the 1996 Maritime Security Act will 
cease in six years or less. Recent U.S. ocean 
shipping reform also appears to be having a 
detrimental impact on U.S. seafaring labor.
Impact of U.S. Ocean Shipping Regulatory 
Reform
On May 1, 1999, the U.S. Ocean Shipping Reform 
Act (ORSA) became effective. This new law 
significantly reduces regulatory control of ocean 
transportation by the U.S. and encourages 
carriers to become more competitive. A major 
provision of the new law allows carriers to 
negotiate confidential service agreements with 
U.S. shippers and importers. Many foreign 
carriers have already taken steps to reduce their 
operating costs so they can attract new business 
by offering lower rates. The general impact on 
most sectors of the U.S. economy should be 
positive since increased competition usually 
fosters better service and lower transportation 
cost, which in turn can lower the price of 
consumer goods. One sector, which will likely feel 
a negative impact, is organized maritime labor. A 
less regulated carrier industry will likely force 
U.S. ship owners to rely even more heavily on 
lower cost foreign crews resulting in a further 
decline in U.S. seagoing union labor.
CONCLUSION
Maritime unions have had significant influence on 
the United States Merchant Marine. From the 
Seamen’s Act of 1915 to the Maritime Security 
Act of 1996, maritime unions have helped shape 
U.S. maritime policy and have provided high 
paying jobs for their members. Maritime unions 
have also supplied the manpower necessary for 
the sealift of military supplies and equipment in 
times of war and national emergency. Most 
recently, U.S. merchants ships and U.S. merchant 
seamen contributed significantly to the success of 
Operation Desert Storm / Shield. However, there 
is legitimate concern for the vitality of the U.S. 
Merchant Marine in the future.
The recent trend in the global ocean carrier 
industry toward consolidation and rationalization 
will likely continue. As large foreign carriers like 
Maersk and Neptune Orient Lines gain control of 
an increasing number of U.S. registered ships, 
more union jobs will be lost. Ocean shipping has 
become more competitive and shipowners must
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operate as efficiently as possible. When the 
subsidies guaranteed by the Maritime Security 
Act of 1996 expire in 2005, ship owners will find 
it difficult to justify the continued use of U.S. 
union seamen. While Congress and the maritime 
special interests groups debate future political 
options to find another temporary fix, it seems a 
permanent solution may rest on what the unions 
do.
It is clear that owners/operators of U.S. flag ships 
want maritime unions to reduce wage rates, crew
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ABSTRACT
As trade markets continue to expand due to developments in transportation and logistics 
technologies, distribution networks extend well beyond national frontiers. With obstacles such 
as distance, language, and business customs, allocation of legal responsibility between a buyer 
and a seller of goods becomes even more crucial in international commerce. This document 
is presented in three general sections. Reviewing the basics, including definition, origin, use 
and classifications of INCOTERMS constitutes the first section. The second section describes 
and analyzes the differences between each of the 13 INCOTERMS 2000. Lastly, the changes 
introduced by the 2000 revision are studied in more detail in section three and implications 
are proffered.
INTRODUCTION
INCOTERMS, an acronym for International 
Commercial Terms, are internationally 
standardized “trade terms” that describe the 
dyadic obligations of both buyers and sellers in 
international sales transactions. Moreover, 
INCOTERMS is a set of 13 terms that clearly 
allocate the costs, risks, customs, and insurance 
responsibilities when internationally 
transporting goods between the buyer and seller. 
Consequently, it is important to stress that
INCOTERMS deal only with the relation 
between sellers and buyers under a contract of 
sale. They do not relate directly to the contract 
of carriage.
INCOTERMS were first developed in 1936 by the 
Paris-based International Chamber of Commerce 
(ICC) as a set of international rules for the 
interpretation of trade terms (Barelier et al. 
1995). These rules, known as “INCOTERMS 
1936,” have been subsequently revised. 
Amendments and additions were later made in
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1953, 1967, 1976, 1980, 1990 and presently in 
2000 in order to bring the rules in line with 
current international trade practices. 
INCOTERMS serve much the same purpose for 
international trade as the Uniform Commercial 
Code does for domestic commerce in the U.S. 
(Journal of Commerce, 1999).
It should be stressed that, when the parties 
intend to incorporate INCOTERMS into their 
contract of sale, they should always make an 
expressed reference to the current version of 
INCOTERMS. Buyers and sellers willing to use 
INCOTERMS 2000 should therefore clearly 
specify that their contract is governed by 
“INCOTERMS 2000.” Further, the correct use of 
INCOTERMS implies that a named port of 
destination or named place of destination has to 
be stipulated to be valid, followed by the 
INCOTERMS version governing their use (e.g., 
EXW La Crosse, WI - INCOTERMS 2000; FAS 
Norfolk, VA - INCOTERMS 2000).
The trade terms have been put together in four 
different groups: E, F, C, and D.
Group E
Group ‘E’ (for “Ex” or from) represents the 
minimum responsibility for the seller, and 
maximum responsibility for the buyer. In this 
group, the seller is only responsible for making 
the goods available to the buyer at the agreed 
place, usually at the seller’s premises.
Group F
Group ‘F’ continues with the seller being “free” of 
responsibility during the main carriage. Thus, 
the seller is called upon to deliver the goods to a 
carrier appointed by the buyer. In others words, 
he/she is not responsible for the main carriage, 
only some pre-shipment charges.
Group C
Group ‘C’ stands for “cost” or “carriage” and 
means that the seller is responsible for 
contracting and paying for the main carriage, but
without assuming the risk of loss of, or damage 
to the goods, or additional costs due to events 
occurring after shipment and dispatch.
Group D
Finally, group ‘D’ means “delivery” and rallies 
five “arrival” INCOTERMS where the seller is 
responsible for the payment and delivery of the 
goods to the country of destination. The seller 
has to bear all the costs and risks needed to 
bring the goods to the country of destination.
Further, INCOTERMS can be classified into two 
categories from a delivery perspective: 1) 
departure contracts; and, 2) arrival contracts. 
“Departure contracts” involve the seller being 
responsible for delivering to a named place in the 
country of export or departure country. The 
seller assumes all costs and risks before crossing 
a border. Departure contracts involve groups ‘E’, 
‘F’, and ‘C.’ Note that the ‘C’ terms are frequently 
misinterpreted as “arrival contracts.” However, 
it must be stressed that under ‘C’ terms, as 
under the ‘F’ terms, the seller fulfills the 
contract in the country of shipment. Thus, the 
contracts of sale under the terms ‘C’ falls within 
the category of “departure contracts.”
“Arrival contracts” require the seller to bear all 
costs and risks involved in bringing the goods to 
an overseas point of delivery. In other words, 
the seller is responsible for the arrival of the 
goods at the agreed place or point of destination 
at the border (DAF) or within the country of 
destination. Hence, the seller assumes most, if 
not all, of the transportation responsibilities. 
Arrival contracts only concern ‘D’ trade terms.
Moreover, carriers and freight forwarders may 
interpret INCOTERMS according to the following 
alternative: “Freight Prepaid” means the seller 
pays the main carriage charges before the 
departure. Therefore, the seller is responsible for 
the costs of the main carriage. It rallies groups ‘C’ 
and ‘D.’ “Freight Collect,” on the other hand, 
means the main carriage charges are collected, or 
payable, at destination, thus the buyer is paying 
for them. Groups ‘E’ and ‘F’ are involved here.
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INCOTERMS 2000
In response to developing technology and 
increasing worldwide use of trade terms, 
INCOTERMS have been revised for the 21st 
century. The revisions were made by the 
Working Party on Trade Terms (WPTT), a group 
of 40 trade experts from around the world. The 
WPTT is a subgroup of the Committee on 
International Practice, which is part of the Paris- 
based International Chamber of Commerce 
(ICC).
After two years of revision of its sales terms for 
the new millennium, the ICC began publishing 
its new edition, INCOTERMS 2000, since 
September 1999. INCOTERMS 2000 are in 
effect with contracts beginning on the 1st of 
January, 2000, and should only be quoted on 
contracts effective from January 2000.
Standard Obligations of Each Party
INCOTERMS rely on and apply to a contract of 
sale, and do not relate directly to a contract for 
carriage. While most of the issues salient to the 
use of INCOTERMS relate to maritime 
transportation, the negotiation of contractual 
obligations represented by INCOTERMS is 
critical to the buyer-seller dyad. Next, we cover 
the seller’s standard obligations, followed by the 
buyer’s standard obligations.
Seller’s Standard Obligations
Packaging and marking. The seller is obliged 
to pack the goods in such a manner as is 
required for the transport, but only to the extent 
that the circumstances relating to the transport 
are made known to the seller at the time the 
contract of sale is concluded. In addition,
marking is to be made appropriately, especially 
when dealing with dangerous goods.
Checking. The seller supports the costs of any 
required checking operations, such as checking 
quality, measuring, weighing, and counting, 
which are necessary for the purpose of placing 
the goods at the buyer’s disposal.
Goods in conformity with the contract. The
goods provided by the seller must be in 
conformity with the contract of sale. Moreover, 
the seller has to enclose the commercial invoice 
and any other evidence of conformity as required 
by the contract.
Notice to the buyer. The seller must inform 
the buyer when and where the goods will be 
placed at his/her disposal.
Buyer’s Standard Obligations
Payment of the price. The buyer must pay the 
exact price as provided in the contract of sale.
Take delivery. The buyer must take delivery of 
the goods when they have been placed at his/her 
disposal in accordance with the designated 
INCOTERM.
DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS
Before going into further details for each of the 
13 INCOTERMS 2000, a description of the 
diagram we use to clarify the 13 INCOTERMS 
and definitions of the terms used will help clarify 
the discussion and allow the reader a better 
understanding. Refer to Figure 1 for the location 
of each of these activities in the goods movement.
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FIGURE 1
Country of origin Country of destination
Charges: Pre-carriage THC Main carriage THC On-carriage
• Pre-carriage: also called “domestic pre­
carriage” or “local cartage,” consists of a 
point-to-point carriage from the shipper’s 
premises or warehouse to the first carrier’s 
terminal or to the freight forwarder’s 
warehouse. Usually covered by inland 
carriers via road, or rail, or a combination of 
road-rail (for full container loads moves - 
FCL), symbolized in the scheme by a truck.
• Export formalities: include export licenses 
& authorizations (obtained through 
Chambers of Commerce), export declaration 
(when the value of the shipment is over U.S. 
$2,000, also called Exdec for Export 
Declaration), certificate of origin, and more if 
needed.
• Export customs clearance: encompasses 
export taxes, duties and fees if required by 
the customs of country of exportation.
• Terminal: means cargo terminal, railway 
station, quay/wharf/port warehouse and/or 
airport.
• Terminal Handling Charges (THC) at 
origin: also called “FOB charges” by freight 
forwarders, include such charges as handling 
fee, storage fee, transfer charges (for 
transferring from the freight forwarder’s 
warehouse to the main carrier’s terminal at 
the airport or at the port terminal), file fee, 
air way bill or bill of lading fee (for issuing 
the transport document), and exceptional 
charges by international organizations.
• Main carriage: deals with the carriage from 
a terminal in the country of origin to a 
terminal in an overseas country. It can be 
air (from airport to airport), ocean (from 
seaport to seaport, more usually called “from 
quay to quay”), road, rail, inland waterway, 
or a combination of such modes.
• Terminal Handling Charges (THC) at 
destination: also called “arrival charges,” 
include such charges as transfer charges (for 
transferring from the main carrier’s terminal 
to the freight forwarder’s warehouse), 
handling fee, storage fee, and dispatch fee.
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• Import formalities: includes import licenses 
and authorization.
• Import customs clearance: involves duties, 
import taxes, fees and other charges related to 
customs.
• On-carriage: also called “local cartage” or 
“domestic on-carriage,” or simply “delivery,” 
consists of a point-to-point carriage from the 
carrier’s terminal to the consignee’s premises 
(most likely the buyer’s premises). Usually 
covered by inland carriers via road, or rail, or 
a combination of road-rail (for full container 
loads moves-FCL), symbolized in the scheme 
by a truck.
• Multimodal: several different modes of 
transport used successively on one single 
shipment.
• Carrier: a person or entity whom 
commences to perform or to procure the 
performance of transport by rail, road, air, 
ocean, inland waterway or by a combination 
of such modes.
COMPARING THE OLD AND THE NEW
For each of the INCOTERMS 2000, a description 
of the responsibilities and obligations of each 
party is stated. Any change between the 
INCOTERMS 1990 and INCOTERMS 2000 is 
emphasized in bold. Figure 2 provides a 
summary of the characteristics of each of the 13 
INCOTERMS.
EXW EX WORKS (...named place)
The seller delivers by placing the goods at the disposal of the buyer at the named place of 
delivery, usually the seller’s premises or another named place.
Seller Must Buyer Must
• Make the goods available at he agreed 
place, usually his/her premises.
• Take delivery of the goods at the agreed place when 
available.
• Load goods on the collecting vehicle.
• Provide export customs clearance.
• Bear all costs and risks involved in bringing the goods from 
the place of delivery to the desired destination, including:
'"^Pre-carriage,
*THC at origin,
(continued)
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Seller Must Buyer Must
"•Main carriage,
•THC at destination, and 
"•On-carriage.
• Provide import customs clearance.
FCA FREE CARRIER (...named place)
The seller delivers the goods to the carrier selected by the buyer at the named 
place.
Seller must Buyer must
• Deliver the goods to the named place. • Unload goods from the collecting vehicle if 
delivery occurs at a place other than the seller’s
• Load goods on the collecting vehicle, premises.
if the delivery occurs at the seller’s 
premises. • Contract at his/her own expense for the carriage of the 
goods from the named place.
• Provide export customs clearance.
• Bear all costs and risks involved in bringing the goods
• Bear all costs and risks involved in from the place of delivery to the desired destination,
bringing the goods to the place of including:
delivery, including:
•Pre-carriage,
"•Pre-carriage if the delivery occurs at •THC at origin,
any other place but the seller’s premises. •Main carriage,
•THC at destination, and 
•On-carriage.
• Provide import customs clearance.
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FAS FREE ALONGSIDE SHIP (...named port of shipment)
The seller delivers when the goods are placed alongside the vessel selected by the 
buyer at the loading place named by the buyer at the named port of shipment.
Seller Must Buyer Must
• Deliver the goods to the named port of shipment • Select the carrier.
alongside the selected vessel. • Contract at his/her own expense for the carriage
• Provide export customs clearance. of the goods from the named port of shipment.
• Bear all costs and risks involved in bringing the • Bear all costs and risks involved in bringing the
goods to the place delivery, including: goods from the place of delivery to the desired
• Pre-carriage 
•THC at origin
destination, including:
•Loading costs: lighterage and wharfage charges
•Main carriage,
•THC at destination, and 
•On-carriage.
• Provide import customs clearance.
FOB FREE ON BOARD (...named port of Shipment)
The seller delivers when the goods pass the ship’s rail at the named port of shipment.
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Seller Must Buyer Must
• Deliver the goods on board the vessel selected by • Select the carrier.
the buyer at the named port of shipment. • Contract at his/her own expense for the carriage
• Provide export customs clearance. of the goods from the named port of shipment.
• Bear all costs and risks involved in bringing the • Bear all costs and risks involved in bringing the
goods to the place of delivery, including: goods from the place of delivery to the desired
"*• Pre-carriage
destination, including:
"*■ THC at origin Loading costs: lighterage and wharfage
"*• Loading costs: lighterage and wharfage charges to the extent that they are not
charges to the extent that they are not included in the freight,
included in the freight. Main carriage,
THC at destination, and 
"*■ On-carriage.
• Provide import customs clearance.
CFR COST and FREIGHT (...named port of destination)
The seller delivers when the goods pass the ship’s rail in the port of shipment.
Seller Must Buyer Must
• Deliver the goods on board the vessel selected by • Bear all risks of loss or of damage to the goods
the buyer at the named port of shipment. from the time they have passed the ship’s rail at 
the port of shipment.
• Select the carrier.
• Bear all costs and risks involved in bringing the
• Contract at his/her own expense for the carriage goods from the place of delivery to the desired
of the goods to the named port of destination. destination, including:
• Provide export customs clearance. "*■ Unloading costs: lighterage and
wharfage charges to the extent that they
• Bear all costs and risks (but only in the country are not included in the freight,
of origin) involved in bringing the goods to the THC at destination, and
place delivery, including: "*■ On-carriage.
(continued)
* Pre-carriage
"<+ THC at origin
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Seller Must Buyer Must
** Main carriage
* Loading costs: lighterage and wharfage
charges to the extent that they are not 
included in the freight.
• Provide import customs clearance.
CIF COST, INSURANCE, and FREIGHT (...named port of destination)
The seller delivers when the goods pass the ship’s rail in the port of shipment.
Seller Must Buyer Must
• Deliver the goods on board the vessel selected by 
the buyer at the named port of shipment.
• Select the carrier.
• Contract at his/her own expense for the carriage 
of the goods to the named port of destination.
• Provide export customs clearance.
• Contract for the insurance of goods during the 
carriage and pay the insurance premium.
• Bear all costs and risks, but only in the country 
of origin, involved in bringing the goods to the 
place of delivery, including:
"*• Pre-carriage
THC at origin 
■» Main carriage
"*• Unloading costs: lighterage and
wharfage charges to the extent that they 
are not included in the freight.
• Bear all risks of loss or of damage to the goods 
from the time they have passed the ship’s rail 
at the port of shipment.
• Bear all costs and risks involved in bringing 
the goods from the place of delivery to the 
desired destination, including:
** Unloading costs: lighterage and
wharfage charges to the extent that 
they are not included in the freight,
■* THC at destination, and
» On-carriage.
• Provide import customs clearance.
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CPT
The seller delivers the goods to the carrier selected by him/her and pays the cost of carriage 
necessary to bring the goods to the named destination. The buyer bears all risks and any 
other costs occurring after the goods have been delivered.
CARRIAGE PAID TO (...named place of destination)
Seller Must Buyer Must
• Deliver the goods into the custody of the first • Bear all risks of loss or of damage to the goods
carrier. from the time they are into the custody of the
carrier.
• Select the carrier.
• Bear all costs and risks involved in bringing the
• Contract at his/her own expense for the carriage goods from the place of delivery to the desired
of the goods to the named place of destination. destination, including:
• Provide export customs clearance. THC at destination, and 
"*■ On-carriage.
• Bear all costs and risks, but only in the country
of origin, involved in bringing the goods to the 
place delivery, including:
• Provide import customs clearance.
Pre-carriage 
"*• THC at origin
"*• Main carriage
CIP CARRIAGE and INSURANCE PAID TO (...named place of destination)
The seller delivers goods to the carrier selected by him/her and pays the cost of carriage 
necessary to bring the goods to the named destination. The buyer bears all risks and any 
other costs occurring after the goods have been delivered.
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Seller Must Buyer Must
• Deliver the goods into the custody of the first • Bear all risks of loss or of damage to the goods
carrier. from the time they are into the custody of the
carrier.
• Select the carrier.
• Bear all costs and risks involved in bringing the
• Contract at his/her own expense for the carriage goods from the place of delivery to the desired
of the goods to the named place of destination. destination, including:
• Provide export customs clearance. "* THC at destination, and
'*■ On-carriage.
• Contract for the insurance of goods during the 
carriage and pay the insurance premium. • Provide import customs clearance.
• Bear all costs and risks, but only in the country 
of origin, involved in bringing the goods to the 
place delivery, including:
• Pre-carriage
"* THC at origin
**■ Main carriage
DAF DELIVERED AT FRONTIER (...named place)
The seller delivers when the goods are placed at the disposal of the buyer on the arriving 
means of transport (not unloaded) before the customs border of the adjoining country.
Seller Must Buyer Must
• Deliver the goods at the named frontier (or the 
named place at the frontier) but before the 
customers border of the adjoining country.
• Contract at his/her own expense for the pre­
carriage of the goods to the named point.
• Provide export customs clearance.
• Take delivery of the goods at the named frontier.
• Unload goods from the arriving means of 
transport at the named place of delivery.
• Contract at his/her own expense for the on- 
carriage of the goods to the desired destination.
• Provide import customs clearance.
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DES
The seller delivers when the goods are placed at the disposal of the buyer on board the ship 
at the named port of destination.
DELIVERED EX SHIP (...named port of destination)
Seller Must Buyer Must
• Deliver the goods on board the ship at the named • Take delivery of the goods from the ship at the
port of destination. port of destination.
• Select the carrier. • Bear all costs and risks involved in bringing the
goods from the place of delivery to the desired
• Contact at his/her own expense for the carriage destination, including:
of the goods to the named port of destination.
"*■ Unloading costs: lighterage and
• Provide export customs clearance. wharfage charges
THC at destination
• Bear all costs and risks involved in bringing the On-carriage
goods to the place of delivery, including:
• Provide import customs clearance.
"*■ Pre-carriage
"*■ THC at origin
* Main carriage
DEQ DELIVERED EX QUAY - DUTY PAID (...named port of destination)
The seller delivers when the goods are placed at the disposal of the buyer on the quay 
(wharf) at the named port of destination.
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Seller Must Buyer Must
• Deliver the goods on the quay at he named port 
of destination.
• Select the carrier.
• Contract at his/her own expense for the carriage 
of the goods to the named port of destination.
• Provide export customs clearance.
• Bear all costs and risks involved in bringing the 
goods to the place of delivery, including:
Pre-carriage 
• THC at origin 
Main carriage
Unloading costs: lighterage and 
wharfage charges.
Take delivery of the goods from the ship at the 
port of destination.
Bear all costs and risks involved in bringing the 
goods from the place of delivery to the desired 
destination, including:
"■*■ THC at destination (other than costs of
unloading the goods from the ship).
"«*• On-carriage.
Provide import customs clearance.
DDU DELIVERY DUTY UNPAID (...named place of destination)
The seller delivers the goods to the buyer, not cleared for import, and not unloaded from any 
arriving means of transport at the named place of destination.
Seller Must Buyer Must
• Deliver the goods at the named place of 
destination (usually the buyer’s premises).
• Take delivery of the goods at the named place 
of destination.
• Contract at his/her own expense for the carriage 
of the goods to the named place of destination.
• Unload the goods from any arriving means of 
transport.
• Provide export customs clearance. • Provide import customs clearance.
• Bear all costs and risks involved in bringing the 
goods to the place of delivery, including:
(continued)
Pre-carriage
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Seller Must Buyer Must
"*• THC at origin
"*• Main carriage
THC at destination 
'"*• On-carriage.
DDP DELIVERED DUTY PAID (...named place of destination)
The seller delivers the goods to the buyer, cleared for import, and not unloaded from any arriving 
means of transport at the named place of destination.
Seller Must Buyer Must
• Deliver the goods at the named place of 
destination (usually the buyer’s premises).
• Take delivery of the goods at the named place 
of destination.
• Contract at his/her own expense for the carriage 
of the goods to the named place of destination.
• Unload goods from any arriving means of 
transport.
• Provide export customs clearance.
• Bear all costs and risks involved in bringing the 
goods to the place of delivery, including:
'"*■ Pre-carriage
"*• THC at origin
"* Main carriage
"*• THC at destination
"*• On-carriage.
• Provide import customs clearance.
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FIGURE 2
SUMMARY OF THE 13 INCOTERMS
EXW FCA FAS FOB CFR CIF CPT CIP DAF DES DEQ DDU DDP
Packaging & 
marking
X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Checking X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Loading on 
the collecting 
vehicle
X X X X X X X X X X X X
Pre-carriage X1 X X X X X X X X X X X
Export
formalities
X X X X X X X X X X X X
Export
customs
formalities
X X X X X X X X X X X X
THC at origin X X X X X X X X X X X
Loading in 
the vessel
X2 X X X X
Contract of 
main carriage
X X X X X X X X X
Main carriage 
costs
X X X X (X)4 X X X X
Main carriage 
risks
(X)4 X X X X
Insurance X X
Unloading 
from the 
vessel
xf XL X
THC at 
destination
X X
On-Carriage X X
Import
customs
formalities
X
Unloading 
from a 
delivering 
vehicle
X = Seller pays or is in charge of. Italic = ocean and inland waterway terms
1. If FCA Seller’s premises: Pre-carriage is to be borne by the Buyer; if FCA other named place: Pre-carriage is to be borne 
by the Seller.
2. If loading charges are not included in the freight, the Seller pays; if loading charges are included in the freight, the 
Buyer pays.
3. If unloading charges are included in the freight, the Seller pays; if unloading charges are not included in the freight, 
the Buyer pays.
4. The main carriage does not really exist under DAF. The carriage up to the border is just commonly called pre-carriage, 
and beyond the border on-carriage.
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ANALYSIS OF THE 2000 CHANGES AND 
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
The first part of this discussion identifies 
extrinsic changes related to the 2000 revision, 
whereas the second part focuses on intrinsic 
changes of specific terms under which the 
obligations and responsibilities of each party 
have been modified from the INCOTERMS 1990 
to INCOTERMS 2000.
Extrinsic Changes
The general extrinsic changes incorporated in 
INCOTERMS 2000 over INCOTERMS 1990 
relate to: 1) further standardization; 2) greater 
international participation; 3) enhanced 
language translation; and, 4) a reflection of 
increased concerns from U.S. traders. Standard 
sales terms fit in with the trend toward 
standardization in accordance with The 
Harmonized System, Uniform Customs and 
Practices for Documentary Credits in ISO 
Certification. In addition, the new INCOTERMS 
are more in line with the terms used in the 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for 
International Sales of Goods (C.I.S.G.). The 
latest revision of INCOTERMS is truly global in 
nature and process. Though the International 
Chamber of Commerce is based in Paris and 
most of the creators were from the European 
Community, this 21st century revision received 
inputs from outside Western Europe at record 
levels. As listed in the acknowledgements, the 
ICC worked with participants in Canada, China, 
Ecuador, Hungary, India, Islamic Republic of 
Iran, Israel, Japan, Mexico, Peru, Singapore, 
South Africa, Spain, Sweden, and the United 
States. Though INCOTERMS 2000 is currently 
available in English and French, the ICC will for 
the first time publish the new version in 20 
languages, a deviation from the traditional 
French and English-only publications of the first 
seven decades of INCOTERMS.
Anecdotally, U.S. traders have appeared more 
and more concerned with the advantages 
INCOTERMS provide. In fact, changes in the 
new version better reflect U.S. business
practices. Moreover, the USCIB, the powerful 
ICC United States affiliate showed an unusually 
active interest in this INCOTERMS revision. 
This organization consists of many 
“heavyweight” members, some of them large 
enough to force any issue with their vendors and 
customers. In practice, therefore, this contingent 
was instrumental in the revisions completed by 
the ICC in 1999.
Intrinsic Changes
The changes in the new version salient to the 
various 13 INCOTERMS include specific changes 
in: 1) FCA, 2) FAS, 3) DEQ, and, 4) DAF. The 
biggest change in the revisions concerns 
INCOTERM FCA, Free Carrier. In INCO­
TERMS 1990, FCA referred to seven different 
modes of transport: air, ocean, inland waterway, 
container, multimodal, highway, and unnamed 
modes of transport. Recognizing that 
multimodal transport is now the norm, under 
INCOTERMS 2000 FCA has now a single 
application. If the goods have to be delivered at 
the seller’s premises, then the delivery is 
contractually completed, and the seller’s 
responsibility ends when the goods have been 
loaded in the collecting vehicle provided by the 
carrier that will deliver the goods to the buyer. 
If the delivery occurs at a place other than the 
seller’s premises, the seller’s responsibility ends 
when the goods are placed at the disposal of the 
carrier designated by the buyer.
In other words, if the delivery is not made at the 
seller’s premises, then the seller is not obliged to 
unload the goods when the goods arrived in the 
collecting vehicle at the carrier’s terminal or 
freight forwarder’s warehouse. The seller just 
leaves the goods at the disposal of the 
international carrier, who will unload goods from 
the truck, but under the buyer’s responsibility. 
Consequently, FCA now allocates more precisely 
the costs and risks for unloading operations. 
This change is significant because 
transshipments are likely to be a source of 
litigation due to losses and damages occurring 
frequently during transshipments, depending on 
the trade lane(s) involved.
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Under INCOTERMS 1990, FAS implied that the 
buyer had the responsibility to provide export 
customs clearance. This responsibility has been 
transferred to the seller under INCOTERMS 
2000. Consequently, EXW is now the only term 
under which the buyer is responsible for export 
clearance; under any INCOTERMS other than 
EXW, it is now the responsibility of the seller to 
clear goods for export. Similar to FAS, under 
INCOTERMS 1990, import clearance was the 
responsibility of the seller. However, with 
INCOTERMS 2000, it is now the buyer who has 
the responsibility of clearing the goods for 
import. These two changes significantly ease the 
fulfillment of such a legal obligation.
In fact, under INCOTERMS 1990, one party was 
forced to deal with the customs rules in the home 
country of the other party. Under INCOTERMS 
2000, customs issues are now handled by the 
local party. Emmanuel Jolivet, ICC’s policy 
manager for international commercial practice, 
reasons “The reason for the changes, clearly, is 
that it is easier for a party living in a particular 
country to clear goods for import or export in 
his/her own country” (Freudmann 1999). 
Reflecting the urgency the ICC working group 
desired on this issue, these changes were made 
right at the very start of the revision process. 
Finally, the term “DAF” now applies only to land 
borders, whereas under INCOTERMS 1990, it 
could be used for all modes of transport. 
Consequently, DAF is now only applicable for 
rail or road shipments, or a combination of both 
modes of transport.
IMPLICATIONS
Understanding the differences between the 
various INCOTERMS will allow for better 
negotiation, fewer misunderstandings, and 
reduced costs (e.g., financial and opportunity 
costs) of conducting trade internationally. There 
is strong anecdotal evidence that suggests it is 
extremely costly to misunderstand the critical 
points at which cost and responsibility legally 
transfer from buyer to seller.
On one account the authors are familiar with, a 
U.S. Midwestern firm was shipping a full 
container load (FCL) of pens and other items 
from a seller in Asia. The U.S. firm would 
periodically procure items from their Asian 
supplier and would engrave corporate logos and 
re-sell them to clients throughout the globe. 
The INCOTERM negotiated and used was 
usually FOB - Singapore, though the seller was 
willing to take on more risk and responsibility 
(i.e., use another INCOTERM in the C or D 
range) for a nominal cost. Recall, under FOB, 
the buyer must contract at his/her own expense 
for the carriage of the goods from the named port 
of shipment, including the procurement of 
marine insurance. Under the Carriage of Goods 
by Sea Act (COGSA), which ratified the 1937 
Hague Rules in the U.S., the steamship line is 
only responsible for $500 per container if the 
container is lost or destroyed at sea. The 
steamship line carrying the container load of 
pens hit rough waters and several containers 
were lost at sea. The importer, who was not 
insured, received $500 for the loss from the 
steamship line, though the value of the cargo 
was worth well over $125,000 U.S. Dollars. The 
firm made a costly mistake that could have been 
easily avoided. The implications for not 
understanding the strategic usage of 
INCOTERMS can be very detrimental to firms.
Similarly, since May 1st, 1999, the Ocean 
Shipping Reform Act of 1998 (OSRA) went into 
effect on U.S. trade lanes. The law effectively 
scrapped the century-old concept of “common 
carriage” — the notion of equal treatment for 
similarly situated shippers (Stapleton and Ghosh 
1999). The new law encouraged a landmark 
shift from common carriage to contract carriage 
(Beargie 1998), by disallowing the practice of a 
firm allowing another to undertake the costs of 
negotiating with steamship lines for carriage and 
simply claiming “similarly situated status” and 
demanding a “me-too” rate. OSRA deregulated 
the maritime environment and allowed firms to 
contract confidentially with steamship lines. 
Competitors are no longer allowed to let the 
industry leader garner the best possible rate
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(due to volume and negotiating power) and sit 
back and claim “similarly situated status.” Since 
contracts are now confidential between shippers 
and carriers, competing shippers can no longer 
figure out the critical elements of a contract, 
including the cost and INCOTERM specified 
between buyer and seller, or consignee and 
consignor. Therefore, a firm who strategically 
takes on more cost and risk (by changing to a 
Group C or Group D INCOTERM), though 
nominal, stands a good chance of increasing 
market share.
CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS 
FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The main reason for a new revision of 
INCOTERMS 1990 was the need to adapt them 
to contemporary commercial practice. The intent 
of the revision process, which has taken about 
two years, was not merely to review each of the 
13 INCOTERMS, but to bring them in their 
entirety in line with contemporary global trade. 
Indeed, the motivation was far beyond formal or 
substantial changes. The ICC meant to extend 
the use of its trade terms by further globalizing 
their concept. Consequently, the ICC 
concentrated on simplifying and standardizing 
its terminology to harmonize it with 
international trade practices.
This goal seems to have been reached since a 
wide-range of world traders participated in this 
revision process. It appears more and more 
clearly that INCOTERMS now enjoy worldwide 
recognition.
Finally, considering that any change involves 
adaptation, it should be interesting to study how 
these changes affect international trade 
practices between buyers and sellers, and how 
carriers and freight forwarders react to them. 
This can be the subject for a later study in the 
new millennium.
As markets continue to expand due to 
technological developments in transportation 
and logistics, distribution networks will extend 
well beyond national frontiers. With obstacles 
such as distance, language and business 
customs, the allocation of responsibility between 
a buyer and a seller of goods becomes even more 
crucial. This is where INCOTERMS strategies 
will continue to remain critical in international 
commerce.
It is hoped that our extensive review of the 13 
INCOTERMS and their revision will help 
practitioners in both the understanding of the 
terms and in realizing their strategic 
implications for transporting cargo in the vastly 
changing international context of global 
commerce. Further, it is our hope that this 
discussion will lead to better understanding 
among academicians in both the importance of 
teaching these rich concepts and in research. 
Future research can seek to understand the 
strategic implications in the usage of 
INCOTERMS; whether adopting one 
INCOTERM strategy over another will lead to 
competitive advantage; and whether changes in 
terminology impact shipping practices similarly 
on both sides of the buyer-seller dyad.
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ABSTRACT
In the railroad industry, the ability to assess damages to rail units in an accurate and timely 
manner is critical to the success and profits of a company. Accurate damage assessment of 
rail units also plays a key role in dispute resolution and negotiation with key vendors and 
suppliers (my.uprr.com/pub/dam-prev). This paper describes and presents information about 
Union Pacific Railroads (UPRR) and Science Applications International Corporations (SAIC) 
highly successful efforts in fully automating the data collection, inspection, assessment and 
reporting of damage claims to rail equipment. UPRR and SAIC used an innovative and highly 
creative approach to develop and implement the Automated Gate System (AGS) by 
integrating a portfolio of leading edge high resolution imaging and optical character 
recognition technologies. AGS is a unique and revolutionary system in the transportation 
industry and has yielded significant strategic and long-term benefits to the company. The 
reengineering efforts that preceded the development of the system have helped the company 
to sustain its position as a leader in the railroad industry.
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INTRODUCTION
Union Pacific Corporation is one of North 
America's leading transportation, computer 
technology and logistics companies, with 
operations in all 50 United States, Canada and 
Mexico. With headquarters in Omaha, Nebraska, 
Union Pacific Corporation currently has over
52.000 employees, covers more than 36,000 miles 
of track in 23 states and has an annual payroll in 
excess of $3 billion. There are 1700 people in 
information technology alone with a budget of 
about $250 M. The company's web site at 
http://www.uprr.com provides a comprehensive 
corporate profile of the company.
Science Applications International Corporation 
is the nation's largest employee-owned research 
and engineering company, providing information 
technology and systems integration products and 
services to government and commercial 
customers. SAIC scientists and engineers work 
to solve complex technical problems in telecom­
munications, national security, health care, 
transportation, energy, the environment, and 
financial services. With annual revenues of $4.7 
billion, SAIC and its subsidiaries have more than
38.000 employees at offices in more than 150 
cities worldwide.
Intermodal units are critical for the sustained 
success of a railroad company and hence it is 
important to ensure that these units are in good 
working condition. As customers’ demand more 
speedy and efficient transportation of goods, rail 
intermodal service — the movement of trailers or 
containers by rail and at least one other mode of 
transportation — is ideally suited to meet this 
demand. That is one of the reasons intermodal is 
the fastest growing segment of the railroad 
industry (my.uprr.com/pub/notes). Intermodal 
traffic has grown from 3 million trailers and 
containers in 1980 to 8.7 million in 1997 and 
accounts for more than 17 percent of rail 
revenues, second only to coal at 22 percent 
(www.aar.org). Intermodal transportation yields 
many powerful benefits (www.aar.org):
• Fuel efficiency. Rail intermodal service on 
average uses less than half as much fuel as 
highway transport to move the same 
shipment the same distance.
• Convenience and partnerships.
Intermodal combines the door-to-door 
convenience of trucks with the long-haul 
economy of rail service. As a result, railroads, 
trucking companies and intermodal 
marketing companies are forming productive 
partnerships to combine the best of both 
modes.
• Improved air quality. Moving a ton of 
freight by rail instead of truck results in less 
than one-third the emissions into the air.
• Reduced traffic congestion. A single 
intermodal train can remove as many as 280 
trucks from the highways.
• Innovative technology. Intermodal 
technology, such as double-stack trains (one 
container on top of another) permit one train 
with two crew members to remove up to 280 
trucks from the highway, reduce pollution 
and save energy.
Railroad regulations require the inspection of all 
intermodal equipment (vans, containers, chassis) 
during yard entry and exit to ensure that 
damages to a unit are positively identified and 
charged to the responsible party (“Building the 
Systems...,” 1999). This is a very critical step if 
the railroad is to recover damage claims assessed 
by equipment owners and also to win disputes 
regarding the timing and extent of damage.
In January of 1995, during a strategic planning 
exercise at the company, it became clear that 
there was room for improvement in the way the 
company managed and maintained its 
intermodal units. Reengineering current inter­
modal operational process and practices would
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help the company be more responsive to 
customer needs while increasing its operational 
efficiencies and profits. Due to increased global 
competitiveness, customers expected their 
transportation companies to be agile and 
responsive. After considerable discussion among 
top and middle management, the company 
established the following primary goals for the 
reengineering effort of intermodal operations:
• Increase data accuracy
• Reduce transaction processing time
• Increase the rate of collections from damage 
claims
• Increase accuracy of the damage inspection
• Decrease number of yard personnel
As the reengineering team began to look closely 
at the intermodal operations, it became evident 
that two processes were big bottlenecks in 
achieving desired efficiencies. These were the 
ingate (arrival of an intermodal unit at a given 
rail yard) and outgate (departure of an 
intermodal unit from a rail yard) processes. The 
process of manually assessing and recording 
damages was slow, cumbersome, and error- 
prone. Since damages were manually assessed 
by physical inspections at the terminal gate, 
damages to intermodal equipment were often 
missed or inaccurately recorded. To make 
matters worse, in many cases, it was difficult, if 
not impossible, to retrace the steps and correct 
the inaccuracies. Further, since all damages 
were recorded on a form and filed for future 
reference, it was impossible to make effective 
business decisions involving claims. Managers 
often had little or no knowledge of the nature of 
the claims and found it difficult to be proactive 
based on trends in filed claims. As the volume of 
railroad traffic continued to increase 
significantly and customers became more 
demanding, it became clear that this slow, labor- 
intensive and error-prone process needed to be
changed. The company decided to completely 
automate the in-gate/outgate processes and thus 
AGS was born. Currently there are three AGS 
systems in place. Marion, Arkansas (outside of 
Memphis, TN), Mesquite, Texas, and Kansas 
City, Missouri. The fourth system will be 
installed in mid to late 2000 in Oakland, 
California.
HOW AGS WORKS
The basic function of the Automated Gate 
System (AGS) is to automate the data collection, 
inspection, assessment, and reporting processes 
at intermodal gates. This required the creative 
application and integration of a wide variety of 
information technologies. The AGS System 
Architecture utilizes three separate network 
paths to accomplish the large amount of 
throughput required for image transfer and 
image display.
Although AGS is based on leading-edge 
technologies, (and some even bleeding-edge for 
its time), great leadership, outstanding project 
management, exemplary team work, a rigid 
discipline for organization, and a keen sense for 
detail has made AGS a remarkable success story 
in the transportation industry. At a cost of more 
than two million dollars and four years of 
development work, AGS has become a strategic 
information system for Union Pacific Railroads. 
AGS is the product of a number of technologies 
working together in an innovative and 
meaningful way. Figure 1 shows the subsystems 
that constitute AGS. The following section 
explains how AGS works.
Driver Enters Terminal
When an intermodal unit first arrives at a yard, 
it is guided by inductive loops embedded in the 
pavement at strategic locations in the yard. Live 
digital video conferencing technology facilitates 
communication between the AGS operator and 
the intermodal driver at the gate stand. For 
example, each gate stand in a rail yard has a
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FIGURE 1
(This diagram shows the communications links between various applications. Numbered links are 
TCP/IP sockets; lettered links are Win32 messages.)
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color video camera that displays a live image of 
the driver on the AGS workstation monitor. This 
image is captured as a digital snapshot and 
attached to the transaction images. Also, 
mounted directly to the rear of each gate stand 
lane is a two-way digital audio system that 
facilitates communication between the driver 
and the AGS operator when the driver is at the 
rear of the unit. Each gate stand has a call 
button to notify the AGS operator of the need to 
communicate verbally and this appears as a 
visual display on the AGS monitor. The AGS 
operator uses a hands-free head set for voice 
communication with the truck driver and a foot 
pedal to activate the unit’s transmission.
Instructional signs direct the driver to wait until 
the portal control light turns green. A portal is 
composed of ten digital cameras, four light 
curtains, and two Automatic Equipment 
Identification antennas. There are seven line- 
scan cameras that take a Vs” slice of video as the 
truck drives through the portal at 10 MPH and 
three area scan cameras that take area pictures 
of the rear of the intermodal unit and its tires.
The Video Inspection System integrates image 
analysis, vehicle axle count and optical character 
recognition technologies. Optical character
recognition identifies and scans alphanumeric 
characters on the left side, right side and back 
side of a unit to produce a high-resolution digital 
image of the top, sides, nose, rear, tires and 
under carriage of all units passing through the 
portal. These images are stored locally for 
playback review to inspect damages, validate 
equipment identification marks and hazardous 
material placards. The results of this scan are 
then compared with data residing in the 
Intelligent Character Recognition (ICR) system, 
an integrated database of all equipment 
identification prefixes. The AGS operator can 
perform a visual inspection of the images after a 
single unit or multiple units (as in the case of 
“pups”) pass through the camera portal. Using 
“point and click” screen icons, the operator can 
review the images.
Based on the images, the vehicle at the yard is 
then classified into one of the following:
1. A tractor (bobtail)
2. Tractor with chassis
3. Tractor with trailer or container tractor with 
multiple trailers or containers or non- 
intermodal vehicles.
FIGURE 2
GATE CONTROL SCREEN THAT UPDATES THE STATUS 
OF INCOMING AND OUTGOING UNITS
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Interior Inspection
The next step is to ensure the accurate 
inspection of the unit. Mounted directly to the 
rear of each gate stand lane is a color camera 
that views and takes live images of the inside of 
the unit. These images are then displayed and 
controlled by the AGS operator using the GATE 
CONTROL function to inspect empty returned 
units or blocking and bracing of loads to ensure 
that the load inside the container does not shift 
in transit. Refer to Figure 2.
Once the unit passes properly through the 
camera portal, the system creates an icon to 
represent the unit on the AGS operator’s 
monitor. The icon includes the initial of the unit 
and its identification number, which are then 
displayed in the "portal queue" areas on AGS. 
Refer to Figure 3.
FIGURE 3
ICONS AS THEY APPEAR 
ON THE GATE CONTROL SCREEN
bobtail
chassis
van
container
multiples
Once the icon appears on the AGS screen, the 
operator begins the inspection process by 
viewing the images. A gate stand refers to an 
interactive monitor, a keyboard, two-way hands­
free voice intercom, call button, driver image 
capture, printer, electronic driver identification,
and a magnetic card reader. A Gate Stand 
computer is installed at each inbound and 
outbound lane. The Gate Stand is the driver’s 
interface and lane controller. These computers 
are intended to gather pertinent information 
from the driver and transfer that information to 
the System Controller for validation and further 
use in the process. The Gate Stand computer is 
also used to allow the controller at the Playback 
to communicate with the driver.
AGS prompts the user with screen menus for 
data entry in order to process the gate 
transaction. The driver interface is designed to 
be as user friendly as possible with minimum 
interaction from the driver yet still gather as 
much of the required data as possible before the 
AGS operator is needed (if needed) to complete 
the transaction. The data the driver is asked to 
input is relevant to the particular transaction 
type as identified by the system. In most cases, 
it is expected that the data input received from 
the driver will leave the AGS operator with 
handling only exceptions or lack of required 
data. If, at any time during the process, the 
driver is unable to complete the data entry, the 
AGS operator may intervene and complete any 
portion or all of the transaction.
AGS allows for inspection at any time, i.e., as 
soon as the units arrive or at a later time, as 
long as the images are available. This allows 
terminal managers at different yards to establish 
their own policies and guidelines as to when the 
inspection should be done. While viewing the 
images the AGS operator may inspect and report 
damage (if applicable) and verify equipment 
identification marks. The destination 
information is supplied and formatted on the 
playback display. As indicated earlier, since 
each gate stand has a video camera to capture a 
live image of the driver, a still snapshot of the 
driver is captured automatically and stored with 
the gate transaction. Each gate stand also has a 
magnetic card reader that allows drivers to 
swipe their identification cards and capture and 
match the driver’s identification in the system.
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System Output
Each gate stand also has an enclosed ticket 
printer that automatically feeds the gate receipt 
when the transaction has been processed. A gate 
receipt is similar to an invoice that vendors use 
to receive payment for delivering or picking up 
units. The gate receipt on a complete transaction 
includes information about the date, time, 
location, driver name, initial and number of the 
chassis, yard disposition instructions, and 
information about damages, if any.
The driver enters the unit initial and number or 
presses the NO key to identify a bobtail 
transaction (a transaction to indicate that the 
driver is in the yard to just pick up a unit. This 
information is compared with units in the ingate 
queue to identify a match. If one is found, the 
unit icon on the GATE CONTROL display on the 
AGS workstation is automatically moved to the 
gate stand to associate the data input with the 
portal images. If a match is not found, the driver 
is prompted to verify the input and re-enter the 
data. If the driver validates the information and 
a match is still not found, AGS notifies the AGS 
operator to complete the transaction.
Next, AGS checks for equipment classification 
(in the case of a chassis, gate control is handed 
over to the AGS operator to complete the 
transaction as there is no further input required 
from the driver.). AGS then generates a data 
packet to send to the mainframe (TCS) to check 
for billing information. If billing information is 
not found in the TCS, the system will prompt the 
driver to identify if the unit is loaded or empty. 
The goal is to collect as much required data as 
possible from the driver to assist in any billing 
inquiry activity.
The next AGS screen captures the seal numbers 
and contents associated with each unit. The 
shipping company applies a seal to each unit in 
order to prevent any tampering with the 
contents. If the seal is missing, then Union 
Pacific will not allow the unit to enter the rail
yard, until another seal has been supplied and 
the new number entered in the system. In the 
case of multiple units (as in the case of “pups”), 
the driver enters the details for each unit and 
the steps are repeated until details about all 
units are entered in the system.
Once the driver completes the input process, the 
AGS operator assumes responsibility for 
completing the transaction. The data collected is 
sent to TCS in the form of a van arrival for TCS 
processing. If the message is processed without 
errors, a buckslip is printed at the gate stand 
and the driver has the option to inquire about 
units in the yard for pickup. Otherwise the 
system is reset for the next transaction.
TECHNOLOGY BEHIND AGS
The AGS system consists of Acquisition 
computers, Gate Stand computers, Playback 
computers, Image Server computers and a 
System Controller Computer. Acquisition 
Computers reside in the Signal Cabin which is 
physically centered between the In and Out 
portals. There are three Acquisition computers 
for each portal: Left Acquisition, Right 
Acquisition and Auxiliary Acquisition. The Left 
Acquisition computer is responsible for capturing 
and transferring image data from the three line 
scan cameras mounted on the left side of the 
portal. The Right Acquisition computer is 
responsible for capturing and transferring image 
data from the three line scan cameras mounted 
on the right side of the portal. The Auxiliary 
Acquisition computer is responsible for the Top 
Scan, Rear Shot and Left and Right Tire Shots. 
The Auxiliary Acquisition computers handle the 
I/O from the portals as well as from the queuing 
lanes.
Gate Stand computers were described earlier. 
Playback Computers serve as the user interface 
to the AGS System and are located in the 
Operations area of the Gate House. They are 
used to display truck images and handle the gate 
process which involves getting information from
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the driver and verifying that the driver can enter 
the yard. This process can also involve creating 
damage reports, registering drivers and possibly 
establishing a video conference with the driver at 
a gate stand.
The In-Portal Image Server and Out-Portal 
Image Server computers are located in a rack in 
the communications room in the Gate House.
Each Image Server handles the reception of the 
raw image data, creates the viewed images and 
handles the archiving of the image to optical 
disk. The System Controller computer is also 
located in a rack in the communications room in 
the Gate House and is responsible for handling 
all of the data packets passed between machines 
as well as maintaining the truck image database. 
The team structure for AGS is shown in Figure
4.
Drafting'
Shipping
Receiving
Procurement
Installation
FIGURE 4
TEAM STRUCTURE FOR AGS
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MEASURE OF SUCCESS
AGS has become one of the most successful 
information systems in the company’s history 
and continues to yield significant extrinsic and 
intrinsic benefits to the company and to its 
customers. A recent cost/benefit analysis 
comparing hand held technology with AGS 
shows a 75% reduction in labor at the three 
existing locations. The ROI of AGS is 
approximately 40%. Some of the benefits of AGS 
include
• Increased Customer Satisfaction. AGS
helped reduce time to process units at the 
gate by more than 70%. Thus customers 
were able to get in and get out of the yards 
quickly, leading to significant efficiencies for 
both UP and its customers. Further, 
customer satisfaction increased when AGS 
was implemented.
• Increased Revenue. While revenue 
attributable to AGS is confidential, it is safe 
to say that profits attributed to AGS are 
significant. Further, evidence points to 
greater throughput for drayage companies, 
which increases their ability to achieve 
higher volumes of traffic through the rail 
yards.
• Reduction in Personnel. Significant 
reductions were achieved in the number of 
personnel required at the gates. In several 
yards around the country, the number of 
internal gate operators decreased by more
"Building the Systems: Why Architecture 
Matters," (1999). Nation's Cities Weekly, Vol. 
22, No. 10, pp. 9-10.
http://www.aar.org/comm/statfact.nsf/5406ac73
3125e6c7852564d000737b60/fdf95cfeef772fc
3852568800067074d.
than 50% while the number of outside gate 
operators has been completely eliminated.
• Improved Decision-Making. AGS
continues to play an important role in 
enhancing the quality of decisions. There 
has been a significant increase in the 
integrity and accuracy of critical 
transportation data collected at the yards, 
leading to better decision making at the rail 
yards and throughout the company.
• Reduction in damage claims. Finally, 
AGS has helped Union Pacific to achieve 
significant reduction in damage claims paid 
to its customers. Since photographic 
documentation of all units passing through 
the AGS data acquisition portals is available, 
it is easy to settle claims, thus decreasing the 
number of litigious claims.
• Leader in the field. Union Pacific is a 
leader in the field and hence customers have 
high expectations of the company. Managers 
attribute the smooth flow of traffic through 
the rail yards to AGS. Charles Whited, 
Senior Manager of the Union Pacific 
Intermodal Terminal, Marion, AR, says, “ For 
example, on 8/11/99 we did 1,065 arrivals 
and departures. It is my opinion that traffic 
flow and congestion is much better than with 
any other system we have had. Also, this is 
done with fewer people working the gate. 
With AGS we have 3 people at peak 7am to 
1900pm and one person at other times. 
Without AGS I believe we would need 8 
people at peak and 4 at other times.”
http://my.uprr.com/pub/notes/INetBull/2f82_20
2.shtml.
http://my.uprr.com/pub/dam-prev/loading/
intguide/intguil.shtml.
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TRUCKLOAD TRANSPORTATION 
REQUIREMENTS: IN ANTICIPATION 
OF Y2K WITH EPILOGUE
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This article investigates the impact of the much-hyped Y2K phenomenon on truckload 
transportation requirements in the United States, as a result of year-end inventory build-ups. 
The article reports the results of a Y2K Truckload Transportation Survey of truckload 
shippers conducted in August of 1999. Additionally, the article takes a post-hoc look at what 
actually occurred in an effort to completely document the impact of the Y2K phenomenon in 
the dry van, temperature controlled, and flatbed segments of the truckload transportation 
industry.
INTRODUCTION
It is highly unlikely that many of us escaped the 
what-if scenarios of the Y2K phenomenon. 
These scenarios ranged from a non-event 
scenario where nothing happens and life goes on 
without a hitch, to the more media-hyped 
doomsday scenario where civilization as we know 
it disintegrates as humans are incapable or 
unprepared to exist without computer 
assistance. Olgeirson (1999) describes this latter 
scenario in a hypothetical situation where, in 
each case, the worst does happen, panic sets in, 
and society self-destructs. As businesses and 
governments had spent $300 to $600 billion
dollars world wide (Hamilton and Wong, 1999) in 
preparation for this event, reality was thought to 
fall between these two scenarios.
The transportation industry was no exception in 
terms of preparation for tracking carriers, 
shipments, and invoices. In fact, Hamilton and 
Wong (1999) point out that as the transportation 
industry is the central force in the supply chain, 
how this industry reacted to and prepared for 
the Y2K phenomenon would have far reaching 
effects on everyone from manufacturers to end- 
users. They further contend that not all reports 
on transportation preparedness were 
encouraging. In fact, by some estimates, the
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transportation industry ranked near the bottom 
of industries addressing the Y2K problem and it 
was estimated that approximately 50% of these 
companies would experience mission-critical 
failures. Brandt (1999) reported that a 
government survey conducted by the Special 
Committee on the Year 2000 Technology 
Problem revealed only 62% of the responding 
transportation companies had completed Y2K 
preparations. Medium sized fleets were 
described as facing the largest challenge in 
preparing for the year 2000 since they typically 
have fewer people on their technology staffs than 
do the larger companies. Further, 50% reported 
that they anticipated being involved in some type 
of litigation resulting from the Y2K phenomenon. 
The litigation issue was compounded by 
contractual agreements involving just-in-time 
deliveries. Leffort (1999) reported that the 
transportation industry in general was in a very 
difficult position, as they rely on every member 
of the supply chain.
However, it was thought that the Y2K 
phenomenon might have provided a profit 
making business opportunity for the 
transportation industry. For example, at least 
one large trucking firm postponed its annual 
company Christmas party in anticipation of 
increased demands on its ability to transport the 
vast volume of goods being purchased by 
numerous businesses prior to any possible 
disruption in the supply chain. This expectation 
of increased usage was not an isolated view. 
Watson (1999) noted that shippers were 
protecting themselves from any potential Y2K 
associated problems by stocking increased 
inventories. As a result of this increase in safety 
stock, shippers pre-booked shipments to assure 
adequate equipment availability. Watson 
further noted that this increase in bookings 
might have increased margins by 2% to 4% in 
the motor carrier industry. A variety of other 
potentially positive outcomes also existed. 
Hamilton and Wong (1999) suggested that by 
being forced to deal with the Y2K problem 
companies improved a variety of processes and 
products. These improvements included areas 
such as better communication, standardized bar
coding and electronic manifests, and the 
simplification of multi-mode shipment tracking.
While it is clear that there was a range of both 
positive and negative aspects to the Y2K 
phenomenon, the lack of specific information on 
how firms prepared was disconcerting. 
Thibodeau (1998) reported that many surveys 
relating to year 2000 readiness were never 
returned, perhaps as a result of either being 
unprepared or concerned about their responses 
being used in future litigation. In the 
transportation industry, adequate Y2K 
preparation was a critical determinant of a firm’s 
ability to satisfy their customers, maintain sales 
and market share, increase profits, and 
ultimately ensure long-term survival. Thus, 
from a strategic perspective, Y2K preparedness 
had significant repercussions. While the 
majority of existing research on Y2K has focused 
on computer issues, the primary purpose of this 
study was to examine the customer base of a 
large truckload motor carrier to determine if 
their customers anticipated an increase in third 
and fourth quarter shipping requirements in an 
effort to supplement inventories. Such an 
examination had numerous strategic 
implications for this carrier, as it attempted to 
forecast the affect Y2K might have on its market 
position and profitability. Secondarily, this 
study examined what actually transpired with 
regard to truckload transportation requirements 
as we entered the new millennium.
METHODOLOGY
During August of 1999 approximately six 
hundred shippers utilizing temperature 
controlled, flatbed, and dry van truckload 
transportation services were mailed a one page 
Y2K Truckload Transportation Survey. Ninety- 
eight or 16% of the shippers returned the survey. 
In the context of Y2K, each of the shippers was 
asked four primary questions. The first question 
was, does your firm anticipate an increase in 
truckload transportation requirements for the 
second half of 1999? The second question asked, 
if your firm anticipates the need for extra 
trailers during the second half of 1999 would you
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be willing to rent or lease the trailers? Next the 
shippers were asked, does your firm anticipate 
any other additional truckload related services 
during the second half of 1999? Finally, each 
shipper was asked to indicate the percentage 
increase expected for truckload transportation 
requirements from the first half of 1999 to the 
second half of 1999.
RESULTS
The overall survey results are provided in Exhibit 
1. As shown in the exhibit, forty-four percent of 
the respondents indicated they anticipated an 
increase in their truckload transportation 
requirements in anticipation of Y2K. An 
examination of the table also indicates the 
magnitude of the anticipated increases in 
transportation requirements in anticipation of 
Y2K. The results show that refrigerated ship­
ments were expected to experience the greatest 
gain, with a 34% increase forecast for the final six 
months of 1999 over the first six months of 1999. 
Dry van truckload requirement increases were 
also large, with an increase of 22%. Flatbed 
shipments were expected to increase by only 11%.
Additionally, the results were analyzed by 
comparing the three service types (i.e., 
temperature controlled, flatbed, and dry van) for 
each of the survey questions. Of the respondents 
that indicated a primary service type, 56% 
indicated temperature controlled, 27% indicated 
flatbed, and 17% indicated dry van. Pearson chi- 
square values were calculated for each of the 
three service types with cross-tabs for each of the 
survey questions. No statistically significant 
differences were found between the service types.
While 44% of the respondents indicated that they 
anticipated increases in their transportation 
requirements in anticipation of Y2K, the respon­
dents did not anticipate a strong demand for the 
use of additional truckload related services during 
the last six months of 1999. As the exhibit shows, 
only 9.5% of the respondents indicated a need for 
additional truckload services at the end of the 
year. With regard to the shippers’ willingness to 
lease trailers, the results indicate that few of the 
respondents expressed an interest in leasing 
trailers, with only three percent indicating a 
desire to lease.
EXHIBIT 1
Y2K TRUCKLOAD TRANSPORTATION SURVEY RESULTS
Question Yes No No Response
Does your firm anticipate an increase in truckload 
transportation requirements for the second half of 
1999?
44% 50% 6%
If your firm anticipates the need for extra trailers 
during the second half of 1999, would you be willing to 
rent or lease the trailers?
3% 75% 22%
Does your firm anticipate any other additional 
truckload-related services during the second half of 
1999?
9.5% 80% 11.5%
Overall percentage increase in anticipated 
truckload shipments from second half of 1999
Refrigerated
34%
Flatbed
11%
Dry Van
22%
over the first half of 1999
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CONCLUSIONS AND MANAGERIAL 
IMPLICATIONS
The findings provided guidance for managers as 
they attempted to develop their marketing 
strategies in anticipation of Y2K. One 
implication that may be derived from the results 
is that most shippers did not seem to anticipate 
the “apocalyptic” results often discussed in the 
media. In fact, one might contend that the 
findings show that most respondents believed 
that Y2K would have very little impact on their 
shipping requirements, as fifty percent of the 
respondents indicated that they did not 
anticipate an increase in their truckload 
transportation requirements in the six months 
prior to the year 2000. Furthermore, the vast 
majority of respondents contended that they 
would not be interested in obtaining additional 
trailers or additional truckload related services 
in the second half of 1999, again supporting the 
perception that the impact of Y2K was expected 
to be minimal. The perception that Y2K would 
have little impact on the requirements of the 
majority of shippers may also be advanced by the 
non-respondents. It may be argued that those 
not responding to the survey also did not 
anticipate changes in their shipping 
requirements as they approached the new 
millennium. This argument may be advanced 
based on the premise that customers who 
anticipated any changes in their shipping 
requirements would be well-advised to make 
those changes known to facilitate their supplier’s 
ability to meet their changing requirements. 
The fact that they did not respond might 
indicate that they did not anticipate changes in 
their shipping needs.
However, prior to dismissing the affect of Y2K on 
the requirements of shippers, it should be noted 
that forty-four percent of the respondents 
indicated that they anticipated an increase in 
their truckload transportation requirements in 
the second half of 1999. This forecast may have 
been indicative of a forecasted derived demand 
for their products. For example, as the media 
communicated the dire consequences of the Y2K, 
consumers could have begun acquiring an
inventory of essential products. This consumer 
acquisition process could have been the catalyst 
for additional production of these products, 
which in turn generates additional 
transportation demands for various shippers. 
This argument may be supported by the Finding 
that refrigerated shipping was anticipating the 
greatest increase. Since refrigerated shipping 
may be associated with perishable items, and 
since one possible consequence of Y2K was a 
shortage of basic foodstuffs, products that 
require refrigerated shipping would be ones that 
could be expected to be in greater demand. 
Correspondingly, the relatively low increase in 
expected truckload requirements for flatbed 
shipping (11%) may be indicative of the fact that 
flatbed commodities and heavy equipment did 
not experience the increased demand that would 
result from Y2K fears. Thus, Y2K fears could 
have been allayed by the purchase of subsistence 
items such as food, generators, heaters, 
batteries, etc. which would likely be shipped via 
refrigerated or dry van shippers.
In conclusion, these findings should have 
provided the truckload transportation industry 
with guidance that should have provided 
assistance in developing their strategies and 
tactics prior to the new millennium. First, 
strategically the firm should have recognized 
that those shippers anticipating an increase in 
their requirements represented a target market 
that could be extremely profitable, both in the 
present and in the future. By preparing to 
satisfy the needs of this market, the firm may 
have been able to gain a stronger market 
position in comparison with carriers who have 
failed to forecast, and consequently failed to 
prepare for increases in demand. The stronger 
market position may then have been used as a 
means of developing a competitive advantage in 
future relationships with this market. However, 
to gain a stronger competitive position with this 
market, the firm may be required to maintain or 
enhance its normal level of service, maintain its 
value-oriented pricing policies, and take 
significant steps toward ensuring customer 
satisfaction in order to create a long-term gain 
from a short-term sales opportunity. Second, the
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results also indicated that the firm’s efforts in 
optimizing the opportunities presented by Y2K 
might have been well targeted to specific types of 
businesses. This targeting may have been 
facilitated by an evaluation of the “type” of 
shipper anticipating increases in demand. If, as 
argued, shippers anticipating increases in their 
shipping requirements were those involved with 
“subsistence” items, then targeting firms 
producing and marketing such items may have 
provided the catalyst for the development of a 
new customer base.
The majority of shippers participating in this 
study did not expect changes in their shipping 
requirements, thus arguing against any dire 
results from the advent of the new century. 
Further, even those who anticipated changes did 
not seem to be forecasting major changes in their 
requirements as indicated by the relatively few 
respondents who were willing to lease trailers or 
who expected to use any additional truckload 
services during the second half of 1999. Thus, 
the basic conclusion that was advanced is that 
well-targeted preparations may provide a long­
term market advantage to the carriers prepared 
for changes in shipping requirements associated 
with Y2K, but that the preparations should be 
well-targeted and not designed for the majority 
of shippers.
EPILOGUE
With the exception of some of the world’s most 
spectacular celebrations, the start of the third 
millennium appears to have been a non-event. 
The doomsday forecasts have come and gone 
with the Y2K bug, which, to this point in time, 
has been little more that a common cold. Levy 
(2000) reports that the United States spent 
around $100 billion and the world outlay was 
closer to $500 billion. Did we over spend? No 
one yet knows, as some “experts” predict that 
only about 1% of the problems would occur on 
the rollover date, with others appearing later in 
the year. However, what we do know is that 
very few problems have actually occurred to date 
and those that did are seen as being very minor 
in nature. Kisiel (2000) for example, reports that
the automobile industry was well prepared for 
the problem and has experienced little more that 
a few robots not working correctly and other very 
minor problems, such as incorrect dates, that 
were fixed very quickly.
The motor carrier for whom the research 
reported in this study was conducted was not 
surprised when the year ended. Just as the 
results of the study conducted in August of 1999 
indicated, a surge in truckload shipping 
requirements as the result of inventory hedging 
by their shippers did not occur. The postponed 
Christmas party should have been held during 
December, just as in prior years. The fourth 
quarter results indicated no more than the 
normal seasonal increase in traffic and no sign of 
buyers hoarding raw materials or finished goods. 
Furthermore, demand for truckload 
transportation services in the first quarter of the 
new millennium was stable for this motor 
carrier. This stability indicates that inventory 
levels were not significantly increased in 
anticipation of Y2K or first quarter demand 
would have almost certainly declined.
Additionally, when asked if the costs associated 
with Y2K preparation had paid off. The firm’s 
management responded with a definite yes. 
They stated, “clearly the minimal cost associated 
with the shipper survey, along with a little more 
time spent coordinating with the few shippers 
that were identified in the survey as potential 
Y2K problem shippers, paid off. We had a 
smooth, problem-free transition into the new 
millennium.” In short, the bug may not have 
bitten, but it did force businesses to examine 
their communication links to supply chain 
members with whom computer contact is 
essential. As a result, many companies are 
probably better off than prior to the Y2K event.
In retrospect, it appears that the disasters 
associated with Y2K were more hype than real. 
The results of the hype, however, may be 
perceived in different ways. From a negative 
perspective, the hype resulted in some cases in 
the change of business strategies and tactics. 
These changes resulted in an improper
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deployment of human, technical, and financial 
resources.
Conversely, the Y2K hype also resulted in some 
potentially positive activities. As stated, 
transportation firms not only increased 
communications with their markets customers, 
they also were “forced” to reassess their
strategies. The hype actually may have resulted 
in motivating many transportation companies to 
audit their current strategies, resources and 
tactics and develop contingency plans. These 
audits and reassessments probably created more 
long-term planning activity, which should in­
turn result in improved asset utilization in the 
future.
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MANUSCRIPT SAMPLE
TEACHING LOGISTICS STUDENTS TO TAKE OWNERSHIP OF INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 
DEVELOPMENT
Frank W. Davis, University of Tennessee 
Kenneth J. Preissler, Logistics Insights Corporation
Logistics systems, developed gradually over the past decades, are undergoing necessary radical change in this era of 
increasing global competition. This article describes an approach taken by the authors to teach logistics students 
how to take ownership of designing their own information infrastructure and how to use it to make their 
organizations more flexible, providing more strategic options.
INTRODUCTION
Advances in information systems technology such as data base management systems, bar code scanning, 
telecommunications, and image processing have enabled logistics and information managers with vision to 
reengineer the way the firm conducts its business. The usage of mainframe computers, personal computers, and 
logistics information systems has been widely studied (Gustin 1989). These studies have universally concluded that 
there has been a rapid growth in the usage of computers and logistics information systems.
Computer Usage in the Classroom
The usage of computer applications in a logistics course has also been studied. Rao, Stenger and Wu stated that 
there are several approaches to integrating computers into the classroom in a business curriculum, each with its 
individual advantages and drawbacks (1992).
Table 1 about here
Systems Development In Practice
The study of the information systems development process of computer applications has been almost universally left 
up to the computer science, software engineering, and information systems educators and practitioners.
y = a + lx + ax (1)
REFERENCES
Collison, Fredrick M. (1994), “Transpacific Air Service with Hong Kong: Characteristics and Issues,” Journal of 
Transportation Management, 6(2): 1-39.
Crum. Michael R. (1996), “On the Improvement of Carrier EDI Implementation Strategies,” in EDI Implementation in 
the Transportation Industry, New York: Transportation Press, 387-404.
Johnson, James C. & Donald F. Wood (1996), Contemporary Logistics, 6th ed.. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice- 
Hall, Inc.
Transportation
Professional 
Certification 
Program in
Level 2 - Transportation Planning & Management 
Topics Covered in Two Three Day Blocks Include:
Managerial Roles Statistical Process Control
• Trans. Partnerships/Alliances • Trans. Value Creation
• Carrier Performance Measures • Trans. Data Analysis
• Trans. Activity Based Costing • Future Trans. Trends
- Faculty from multiple universities and major corporations
“The ITRAN course has something for everyone. It provides a comprehensive, 
baseline educational program focused exclusively on the transportation 
business. More people from our company will attend.”
- Tony Hilliard, Columbia Chemicals Corp.
The Institute of International Transportation & Logistics is endorsed by Delta Nu Alpha. 
All DNA members receive a discount on admission to ITRAN sessions.
The next class is scheduled to begin Oct. 10, 2000\
For more information, contact the Logistics Foundation of
ITRAN
229 Peachtree St. NE - Suite 401 
Atlanta, Georgia 30303-1600 
404-524-7777
America within the Georgia Freight Bureau:
